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ABSTRACT 
 
SYSTEMIC INCONGRUITY: 
BRINGING DOWN THE RISKS OF CONFORMITY AND DEVIATION BIASES 
 
Shefali V. Patil 
 
Dr. Philip E. Tetlock 
 
Employees often have to decide whether to conform to or deviate from the status quo. 
Exhibiting consistent preferences for either preserving or maintaining the status quo (i.e., 
conformity biases) or for challenging or rejecting the status quo (i.e., deviation biases) 
can be costly. Conformity biases prevent employees from adapting to changing task 
demands and deviation biases hamper the predictability and reliability of decisions. It is 
therefore important for scholars and practitioners to understand how to engineer work 
environments that, to the degree possible, enable employees to bring down both types of 
risks. However, our understanding of this issue is limited because organizational behavior 
researchers to date have focused on reducing conformity biases but slighted the opposing 
risks of deviation biases. This dissertation is dedicated to filling this gap. Challenging 
research on the benefits of congruent work environments that send consistent normative 
signals, I demonstrate how congruity can push employees into stable patterns of 
conformity or deviation whereas incongruity can trigger more flexible thinking that 
enables employees to reduce both biases. Chapter 1 examines how incongruent 
combinations of distributive justice systems and cultural values—egalitarian-individualist 
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and meritocratic-collectivist—tamp down both risks by encouraging employees to fluidly 
shift between loss-minimizing and gain-maximizing frames. Chapters 2 and 3 present two 
laboratory experiments that demonstrate how incongruent combinations of cultural values 
and accountability systems— collectivist values / outcome systems and individualist 
values / process systems—can also control exposure to both risks by encouraging 
decision makers to iterate between the micro details and big picture. Finally, Chapter 4 
investigates how blends of cultural values and accountability systems shape managerial 
tolerances for employees who exhibit conformity or deviation biases. In a field study of 
working supervisors, I show that managers in congruent combinations—collectivist 
values / process systems or individualist values / outcome systems—either prefer 
conforming employees or deviating employees, respectively, but managers in 
incongruent combinations have no discernible preference. Overall, this dissertation offers 
novel ways to offset the risks of various organizational systems and encourages the field 
to reassess the benefits of intrapsychic conflict in light of the clashing demands 
employees confront today. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
BLENDING DISTRIBUTIVE AND CULTURAL SYSTEMS 
 
Employees often have to decide whether to conform to or deviate from the status 
quo. The decision is not easy—and can carry serious consequences. Sometimes the status 
quo is inappropriate for the situation at hand. That is, current work methods and 
routines (Morrison & Phelps, 1999; Staw & Boettger, 1990), decision making protocols 
(Feldman & March, 1981; Sutcliffe & McNamara, 2001), and bureaucratic rules (Canales, 
2014; Morrison, 2006) are inadequate for a given task. In these instances, employees 
who exhibit conformity biases—or tendencies to favor preserving or strengthening the 
status quo—run the risk of failing to bring about appropriate or necessary change. But 
sometimes current work methods and routines, decision making practices, and 
bureaucratic rules are adequate (Arkes, Dawes, & Christensen, 1986; Dean & Sharfman, 
1993; Hackman & Wageman, 1995). In these instances, employees who exhibit deviation 
biases—or tendencies to favor challenging or rejecting the status quo—run the risk of 
bringing about inappropriate or unnecessary change.  
 Both biases can be costly for organizations (Leana & Barry, 2000). Conformity 
biases hamper learning and adjustment in changing task environments (Grant & 
Ashford, 2008; Griffin, Neal, & Parker, 2007). Microsoft’s recent history under former 
CEO Steve Ballmer is replete with instances of senior executives who exhibited strong 
conformity biases (Eichenwald, 2012). These executives frequently strangled “innovative 
ideas that might threaten the established order of things” (Eichenwald, 2012: 1). In the 
eyes of some critics, one of the reasons why Microsoft continues to lag behind the likes of 
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Facebook, Google, and Apple is that these executives exhibited an unflagging loyalty to 
the status quo. But deviation biases can also be costly. Deviation biases hamper routine 
learning, predictability, and efficiency in stable task environments (Canales, 2014; Levitt 
& March, 1988). The actions of Donald Burr, former CEO of People Express Airlines, are 
a case in point (Prokesch, 1986). In the 1980s, People Express enjoyed roaring success as 
the fifth largest carrier. However, Burr began rapidly overturning all the practices and 
routines the organization had been following for years. Among other things, he broke 
with tradition and bought a heavily unionized carrier, took on operations that were 
typically contracted out, and suddenly refused to reimburse travel agents for lost 
passenger tickets. People Express soon became “People Distress”. The carrier no longer 
exists. 
 Given these costs, it is important for scholars and practitioners to understand 
which types of work contexts increase employees’ vulnerabilities to one bias or the 
other—and whether it is possible to design work settings that bring down the risks of 
both biases. At present, our understanding of this issue is quite limited. The primary 
reason why our understanding is limited is that organizational behavior scholars have 
focused quite exclusively on reducing only one of the two opposing risks: conformity 
biases. For example, they have examined ways to encourage proactivity (Grant & 
Ashford, 2008), creativity (Miron-Spektor, Gino, & Argote, 2011b), creative deviance 
(Mainemelis, 2010), experimentation (Lee, Edmondson, Thomke, & Worline, 2004), 
individual innovation (Scott & Bruce, 1994), de-escalation of commitment (Ross & Staw, 
1993), and adaptivity (Pulakos, Arad, Donovan, & Plamondon, 2000). All these 
behaviors are change-oriented—they involve challenging prevailing ways of doing things 
(Griffin et al., 2007).  
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 Among other reasons, organizational behavior scholars may be preoccupied with 
reducing conformity biases because of the field’s social psychological underpinnings. 
Classic findings in social psychology have found that people are prone to deferring to the 
beliefs and opinions of others, sometimes even when those opinions are clearly wrong 
(Asch, 1951, 1956). People are especially prone to conforming to accepted ways of doing 
things because they look to others as reliable sources of information and want to avoid 
social disapproval (Deutsch & Gerard, 1955). Organizational scholars also tend to be 
particularly suspicious of social forces that encourage conformity, which they find to be 
particularly pernicious (e.g., O'Reilly & Chatman, 1996).  
 I do not contest these findings and arguments—or the value of exploring ways to 
mitigate conformity biases in organizations. However, the skewed emphasis on reducing 
conformity biases precludes us from having a more balanced conversation about the 
different types of risks to which employees are exposed. And because of this skewed 
emphasis, organizational behavior research continues to significantly lag behind its 
macro counterparts in organizational theory and strategy. For the past two decades, 
macro researchers have argued that organizations face competing pressures to balance 
the analogous tradeoffs of exploitation and exploration, standardization and flexibility, 
and stability and change (e.g., Adler et al., 2009; Farjoun, 2010; March, 1991). But due to 
the relative silence of organizational behavior scholars on the issue, we have very limited 
insights on how individual managers manage similar conformity-deviation tradeoffs 
(Lavie, Stettner, & Tushman, 2010). 
 My objective in this chapter is to correct for these limitations. I do so by 
examining how different types of organizational cultures elevate or attenuate the risks of 
conformity or deviation biases at the individual level. Organizational culture is a form of 
social control—a system of shared values, norms, and expectations (O'Reilly & Chatman, 
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1996). I approach my focal question from an organizational culture perspective because 
these cultural systems fundamentally shape how employees approach internal and 
external problems (Schein, 1992b)—and how they ultimately think and act (Hofstede, 
Neuijen, Ohayv, & Sanders, 1990; Schein, 1983; Trice & Beyer, 1993). In particular, 
scholars have argued that organizational culture affects the degree to which employees 
attempt to protect or challenge the status quo (Flynn & Chatman, 2001; Goncalo & Staw, 
2006). As such, organizational culture is a particularly relevant—and important—lens to 
explore how work environments can be designed to bring down the risks of conformity 
and deviation biases.  
 The remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows. First, I specify my 
conceptualization of conformity and deviation biases. Next, I present my model by 
distinguishing among different types of organizational cultures and explaining how and 
why these cultural systems elevate or attenuate the risks of conformity and deviation 
biases. Following this section, I explain why organizational cultures that elevate the risks 
of either bias are likelier to be sustained in organizations. Finally, I discuss the 
theoretical implications of my model. Of note, my model challenges prevalent notions in 
organizational behavior scholarship that work contexts that trigger the same 
psychological states are more beneficial than those that trigger conflicting psychological 
states (cf. Erez, 1986; Lee et al., 2004; O'Reilly, Chatman, & Caldwell, 1991). By contrast, 
I highlight the benefits of work contexts that trigger clashing psychological states in 
reducing exposure to both opposing sets of risks. I also discuss the implications that my 
model has for more macro theories on how organizations balance exploitation and 
exploration—and identify a number of directions for future research. 
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CONFORMITY AND DEVIATION BIASES 
 To reiterate, employees can exhibit tendencies to continuously preserve or 
maintain the status quo (conformity bias)—or employees can exhibit tendencies to 
continuously challenge or alter the status quo (deviation bias).There are three aspects of 
conformity and deviation biases that should be further specified. 
 First, “status quo” broadly refers to current ways of thinking in the organization. 
Certainly, the term “status quo” has been used in a variety of different literatures. For the 
purposes of building this theoretical model, it generally refers to: (a) standard decision 
making practices and protocols (Edmondson, 2008; March & Simon, 1958; Sutcliffe & 
McNamara, 2001); (b) current work methods, routines, and policies (Detert & Burris, 
2007; Grant & Parker, 2009; Staw & Boettger, 1990); and, (c) existing bureaucratic rules 
(Canales, 2014; Morrison, 2006; Tyler & Blader, 2005). Standard decision practices, 
current work methods, and bureaucratic rules all reflect prevailing beliefs about how 
work activities should be conducted—and how the organization should function (Levitt & 
March, 1988). They serve a variety of instrumental and symbolic functions. On the 
instrumental end, standard practices stabilize decision making, increasing the 
predictability and reliability of decisions (Dean & Sharfman, 1996; Hackman & 
Wageman, 1995). On the symbolic end, standard practices help organizations signal to 
scrutinizing constituencies that they are complying with socio-political values and norms 
(Edelman, 1992; Meyer & Rowan, 1977). 
 Second, for each situation, employees often have to decide whether to preserve or 
reject the status quo. My model proposes that certain cultural systems increase employee 
tendencies to consistently preserve—or reject—the status quo across a series of 
situations over time. Employees who continuously exhibit conformity biases risk failing 
to adapt to changing task demands (Grant & Ashford, 2008). Employees who 
6 
 
continuously exhibit deviation biases risk bringing about unnecessary change to stable or 
routine task demands (March & Simon, 1958). But employees who simultaneously bring 
down the risks of both conformity and deviation biases learn when to conform and when 
to deviate—and thus achieve a more productive balance between conformity and 
deviation as tasks fluctuate between stability and change over time (Canales, 2014). 
Compared to those who exhibit either extreme biases, employees who bring down the 
risks of both biases essentially incur a fewer number of situations in which they 
inappropriately conformed to or inappropriately deviated from the status quo. 
 Third, I acknowledge that task predictability caps the degree to which employees 
can reduce the risks of both conformity and deviation biases. Sometimes there is so 
much uncertainty that employees can simply do not better than incur the risks of 
conformity biases or incur the risks of deviation biases—and adjust between these 
preferences depending on what is being rewarded (Taleb, 2010; Taleb, Goldstein, & 
Spitznagel, 2009). Certainly there are tasks in which this uncertainty may exist. But my 
model seeks to explain outcomes when there are sufficient levels of task certainty—and 
there are opportunities to push out the tradeoff frontier—such that exposure to both 
risks are reduced (Tetlock & Mellers, 2011a).      
ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURAL SYSTEMS, REGULATORY FOCUS, AND 
VULNERABILITIES TO CONFORMITY AND DEVIATION BIASES 
 There are many dimensions along which organizational cultures can be 
distinguished (Hofstede et al., 1990). But scholars have argued that one major dimension 
along which cultural systems in organizations can be differentiated is collectivism vs. 
individualism (Chatman & Jehn, 1994; Earley, 1993). A number of studies have 
examined the effects of collectivist vs. individualist cultural systems on a variety of work 
processes and outcomes in organizations particularly relevant to issues of conformity 
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and deviation (e.g., Chatman & Barsade, 1995; Chatman, Polzer, Barsade, & Neale, 1998; 
Goncalo & Staw, 2006). In collectivist cultural systems, employees view themselves as 
interdependent with others—and are motivated by their obligations to each other 
(Wagner, 1995). By contrast, in individualist cultural systems, employees view 
themselves as independent of others—and are motivated by their own attitudes and 
preferences (Chatman et al., 1998). 
 However, the collectivism-individualism dimension is not without its critics. 
Some have argued that the dimension conflates important differences among types of 
collectivist systems and types of individualist systems (e.g., Chen, Meindl, & Hunt, 1997; 
Schwartz, 1990; Vandello & Cohen, 1999). Note that these criticisms are in reference to 
collectivist and individualist systems at the national or societal level of analysis—not at 
the organizational level. But these criticisms have implications for collectivist and 
individualist systems at the organizational level. Indeed the collectivist-individualist 
dimension for organizational cultures was inspired by research on national cultures (e.g., 
Hofstede, 1980). Organizational scholars argued that the same cultural patterns at the 
national level can also emerge at the level of more local, discrete social units such as 
firms (Chatman & Jehn, 1994). In other words, they argued that cultural frames are 
malleable—and can be primed by more immediate situational influences (Brockner, 
2003).  
 As such, criticisms of the collectivism-individualism at the national level may also 
indicate analogous limitations of the construct at the organizational level. To correct for 
these limitations, I draw on a cultural framework advanced by Triandis and colleagues 
(Singelis, Triandis, Bhawuk, & Gelfand, 1995; Triandis, 1995; Triandis & Gelfand, 1998). 
Again, this framework explains differences among national cultures. However, given that 
cultural frames are malleable and organizations can assume similar cultural patterns 
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(Goncalo & Staw, 2006; Oyserman, Coon, & Kemmelmeier, 2002), I apply this 
framework to the organizational level. 
 Triandis and colleagues argue that in addition to the collectivism-individualism 
dimension, cultures can be further distinguished along a horizontal-vertical dimension 
(Triandis, Chen, & Chan, 1998). Whereas the collectivism-individualism dimension 
captures differences in interdependence, the horizontal-vertical dimension captures 
differences in tolerance of hierarchies (Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Shavitt, Lalwani, 
Zhang, & Torelli, 2006). Simply, horizontal cultures are less tolerant of hierarchies than 
are vertical cultures. Of course, a variety of social hierarchies can emerge in 
organizations (e.g., Magee & Galinsky, 2008). For the sake of theoretical precision, I 
focus on hierarchies created by the distribution of resources. Distributive principles are 
one indicator of horizontal or vertical tendencies—or the degree to which an organization 
does or does not tolerate hierarchies (Deutsch, 1985; Erez, 1997; Kabanoff, Waldersee, & 
Cohen, 1995). There are two prominent principles that guide resource distribution: 
egalitarian vs. meritocratic (Wageman & Gordon, 2005). More egalitarian organizations 
distribute rewards equally with no differentiation among individuals—and are thus 
hierarchy-attenuating. More meritocratic organizations distribute rewards in proportion 
to inputs (i.e., equitably) with much differentiation among individuals—and are thus 
hierarchy-enhancing (Castilla & Benard, 2010).  
 Crossing these two dimensions yields four different types of organizational 
cultural systems: egalitarian-collectivist, egalitarian-individualist, meritocratic-
collectivist, and meritocratic-individualist. In the following sections, I explain how these 
different types of cultural systems trigger different types of self-regulatory schemas—and 
how these self-regulatory schemas in turn shape vulnerabilities to conformity and 
deviation biases. Self-regulatory schemas constitute a fundamental element of human 
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motivation (Shah, Higgins, & Friedman, 1998). They refer to the different pathways 
people take to achieve different end goals (Brockner & Higgins, 2001). There are two 
basic self-regulatory states: prevention and promotion (Higgins, 1997, 1998). Prevention 
states are characterized by loss-avoidance, vigilance, risk aversion, and a focus on duties 
and obligations. Promotion states are characterized by gain-maximization, eagerness, 
risk seeking, and a focus on hopes and aspirations.  
 My model appears in Figure 1. 
Organizational Cultural Systems and Regulatory Schemas 
 Egalitarian-collectivist systems. The collectivist component of egalitarian-
collectivist systems emphasizes interdependence and communal relationships (Markus & 
Kitayama, 1991; Triandis, 1995). People in collectivist systems are primarily concerned 
with impression management: saving face, avoiding social disapproval, and adjusting to 
normative constraints (Gelfand, Erez, & Aycan, 2007; Lalwani, Shrum, & Chiu, 2009; 
Triandis & Suh, 2002). In other words, they are strongly driven by the need to fit in and 
behave in socially-sanctioned ways (Crowne & Marlowe, 1964; Van Baaren, Holland, 
Steenaert, & van Knippenberg, 2003). To fulfill this need, they are highly attentive to 
negative information about the self—and use this information to avoid future social 
mishaps (Heine & Lehman, 1999; Kitayama, Markus, Matsumoto, & Norasakkunkit, 
1997). Furthermore, when people view themselves as interdependent, the ought-self 
becomes more prominent—they regulate to others’, as opposed to their own, standards 
of behavior (Cross, Morris, & Gore, 2002). 
 For these reasons, researchers have found close links between interdependent 
cultural systems and prevention, avoidance-oriented schemas (Lee, Aaker, & Gardner, 
2000). People in collectivist systems are essentially preoccupied with avoiding “rocking 
the boat.” Some of the prevention-focused behaviors that these people tend to exhibit 
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include: being more sensitive to failure-avoidance events (not losing) than success-
foregone events (not winning) (Lee et al., 2000), pursuing more avoidance goals (Elliot, 
Chirkov, Kim, & Sheldon, 2001), striving more to minimize potential losses than 
maximize potential gains (Hamilton & Biehal, 2005; but see Hsee & Weber, 1999, for 
boundary conditions), and being inspired by role models who convey the importance of 
avoiding failures (Lockwood, Marshall, & Sadler, 2005).  
 Egalitarian systems, the other component of egalitarian-collectivist cultures, also 
emphasize inclusion and shared membership (Wageman & Gordon, 2005). Egalitarian 
organizations often utilize profit and gain sharing, fringe benefits, and other schemes 
that compress salary differentials (Erez, 1997; Triandis, 2001). In egalitarian 
environments, people value benevolence, universalism, and harmony over power and 
achievement (Erez & Earley, 1987; Oishi, Schimmack, Diener, & Suh, 1998; Schwartz & 
Bilsky, 1987). As such, they tend to adopt prevention focused mindsets, focusing on 
avoiding conflict, standing out from others, or causing harm to solidarity goals (Cutcher-
Gershenfeld & Kochan, 1997; Kabanoff et al., 1995; Meindl, 1989). The priming of 
prevention mindsets is perhaps one reason why researchers have found that people in 
egalitarian systems are less likely to engage in risky activities such as thinking outside 
the box (Goncalo & Kim, 2010; Wageman & Gordon, 2005)—or yielding to minority 
viewpoints (Ng & Van Dyne, 2001). 
 In sum, both components of egalitarian-cultural systems are likely to trigger 
prevention focused mindsets among employees: 
Proposition 1: Employees are more likely to adopt predominantly prevention focused 
mindsets in organizations with egalitarian-collectivist cultural systems. 
 Meritocratic-individualist systems. Meritocratic-individualist organizations 
embrace the mirror-image set of values and beliefs. The individualist component of 
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meritocratic-individualist systems emphasizes independence and distinction (Markus & 
Kitayama, 1991; Triandis, 1995). Because they are focused on being positively distinct, 
people in individualist systems are concerned with self-enhancement goals—and strive to 
present themselves as self-reliant and skillful (Lalwani & Shavitt, 2009). As a result, they 
tend to exhibit many egocentric biases in self-appraisals (Heine, Lehman, Markus, & 
Kitayama, 1999). For example, they are unrealistically optimistic about their 
invulnerability compared to that of others (Heine & Lehman, 1995), rate themselves as 
above average on a variety of personal attributes (Chang, Asakawa, & Sanna, 2001), and 
make self-serving attributions to justify their behaviors (Mezulis, Abramson, Hyde, & 
Hankin, 2004).   
 For people in individualist systems, this preoccupation with distinguishing 
oneself also translates into a strong focus on maximizing potential gains in various 
situations (Lalwani et al., 2009). They are focused on proving their unique abilities. As 
such, researchers have found a positive link between independent cultural systems and 
promotion schemas. In addition to maximizing potential gains (Hamilton & Biehal, 
2005), people in individualist systems are more sensitive to success-foregone events (not 
winning) than failure-avoidance events (not losing) (Lee et al., 2000) and are more 
motivated by success vs. failure feedback (Heine et al., 2001).   
 The meritocratic component of meritocratic-individualist cultural systems also 
triggers promotion states. Equity-based systems essentially incentivize people to 
compete for rewards, power, and influence (Erez, 1997). Employees under these systems 
not only want to be distinct—they want to be the best (Triandis & Gelfand, 1998). To reap 
the benefits of meritocratic systems, people want to develop superior expertise relative to 
others, demonstrate their unique abilities, and gain public recognition of their individual 
achievements (Galbraith, 1971; Mintzberg, 1984). As such, people under meritocratic 
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systems are likely to adopt promotion focused mindsets to maximize their potential for 
gains—and show little loyalty to the status quo. For example, people operating under 
competitive, equity-based systems tend to embark on more gains-oriented, risky 
initiatives such as challenging established decision practices (Arkes et al., 1986) or 
thinking outside the box (Baer, Leenders, Oldham, & Vadera, 2010; Gordon, Welch, 
Offringa, & Katz, 2000; Wageman & Gordon, 2005).  
Proposition 2: Employees are more likely to adopt predominantly promotion focused 
mindsets in organizations with meritocratic-individualist cultural systems. 
 Egalitarian-individualist and meritocratic-collectivist systems. 
Whereas egalitarian-collectivist and meritocratic-individualist cultural systems push 
employees into predominantly prevention focused or promotion focused zones, 
respectively, egalitarian-individualist and meritocratic-collectivist systems trigger 
clashing prevention and promotion regulatory states. In egalitarian-individualist 
systems, the egalitarian component triggers prevention states and the individualist 
component, promotion states. In meritocratic-collectivist systems, the meritocratic 
component triggers promotion states and the collectivist component, prevention states. 
 Kaizen in Toyota’s Production System provides an example of an egalitarian-
individualist system. Egalitarianism is promoted vis-à-vis gain-sharing systems that 
“reward all workers for improvements in plant-wide quality and efficiency” (Adler, 
Goldoftas, & Levine, 1999: 53). But the egalitarian system is embedded in an 
individualist value system in which employees are encouraged and challenged to 
improve work processes utilizing their unique skills and capabilities (MacDuffie, 1995). 
This incongruous configuration is perhaps one reason why the organization as a whole is 
able to achieve continuous improvement such that it is able to strike a balance between 
efficiency and flexibility (Adler et al., 2009).  
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 On the other end, brainstorming sessions at IDEO serve as an example of a 
meritocratic-collectivist system. These sessions are meritocratic “status auctions” in 
which design engineers strive to increase their standing on the technical hierarchy by 
pitching creative ideas on which other designers are able to build their ideas (Sutton & 
Hargadon, 1996). But the meritocratic system is embedded in a collectivist culture 
characterized by interdependent information sharing and collaborative helping in which 
engineers try to enhance each other’s projects (Amabile, Fisher, & Pillemer, 2014). 
Design engineers in these brainstorming sessions “go out of their way to help one 
another…[and] respect each other’s skills” (Sutton & Hargadon, 1996: 706).  
 Research suggests that when contexts prime different psychological states, people 
shift into high-cognitive gear to resolve the contradictions (Schwarz, 1990). That is, they 
think more flexibly—and shift between the psychological states that are primed. For 
example, when people experience conflicting negative and positive emotions, they tend 
to draw unusual connections between competing elements in their environments to 
decrease the conflict (Fong, 2006). People exhibit similar behaviors when confronted 
with paradoxical cognitive frames that cause conflict; they flexibly consider both 
competing elements to resolve the conflict (Miron-Spektor et al., 2011b). Additionally, 
when people are caught in “accountability cross-fire,” or are accountable to opposing 
constituencies, they exhibit more integratively complex thought processes (Green, 
Visser, & Tetlock, 2000). They shift between differentiating two opposing sets of ideas 
and looking for ways to balance the competing concerns.  
 Based on this discussion, I propose:  
Proposition 3: Employees are likely to flexibly shift between prevention and promotion 
focused states when operating in organizations with (a) egalitarian-individualist or (b) 
meritocratic-collectivist cultural systems. 
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Regulatory Schemas and Vulnerabilities to Conformity and Deviation Biases 
 Regulatory schemas affect employees’ vulnerabilities to conformity and deviation 
biases in at least three different ways. First, regulatory schemas affect the degree to 
which employees are willing to take risks. Prevention focused individuals tend to be 
more risk averse (Zhang & Mittal, 2007). Risk-aversion, in turn, is often linked to the 
conservation of accrued gains (Jackson & Dutton, 1988; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979)—
and is one reason why employees tend to conform to the status quo in organizations. For 
example, risk-aversion has been linked to reduced proactivity—or behaviors that involve 
bringing about change to current practices and methods (Grant & Ashford, 2008). 
Employees who engage in proactive initiatives risk threatening supervisor authority or 
suffering serious repercussions if these initiatives result in negative outcomes (Frese & 
Fay, 2001; Parker, Bindl, & Strauss, 2010). Prevention-focused employees are thus likely 
to be especially vulnerable to conformity biases.  
 By contrast, promotion focused individuals are more risk-seeking—and risk-
seeking has been linked to tendencies to overturn the status quo (even to a point of 
detriment). For instance, strong propensities to take risks can cause people to engage in 
chaotic change initiatives (Bunderson & Sutcliffe, 2003; March & Shapira, 1987). During 
these times of chaotic change, employees are unable to discriminate effective from 
ineffective change (March & Olsen, 1976)—or understand causal relationships in a way 
that meaningfully incorporates feedback from the changes being made (Weick, 1984). 
Thus, promotion-focused employees are likely to be especially vulnerable to deviation 
biases. 
 Second, regulatory schemas affect the degree to which employees are motivated 
to engage in extensive hypothesis generation as they go about making decisions. 
Employees with a prevention focus are motivated to generate fewer hypotheses or 
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courses of action whereas those with a promotion focus are motivated to generate 
multiple hypotheses or courses of action (Crowe & Higgins, 1997; Liberman, Molden, 
Idson, & Higgins, 2001; Molden & Higgins, 2008; Woolley, 2011). The degree to which 
people restrict hypothesis generation affects their tendencies to conform to or deviate 
from the status quo. Because the status quo has been tried-and-tested and offers 
security, managers who are motivated to restrict hypothesis generation often adopt the 
status quo—and fail to consider options that challenge current ways of thinking (Nijstad 
& De Dreu, 2012; Staw, Sandelands, & Dutton, 1981). However, managers who are 
motivated to increase hypothesis generation are likelier to challenge the status quo in 
search of better outcomes (Heath, Larrick, & Klayman, 1998; Nisbett, Zukier, & Lemley, 
1981; Tetlock & Boettger, 1989). 
 Third, regulatory schemas affect the degree to which employees are overconfident 
and optimistic. Generally, prevention schemas are linked to under-confidence and 
pessimism whereas promotion schemas are linked to over-confidence and optimism 
(Grant & Higgins, 2003; Hazlett, Molden, & Sackett, 2011; Semin, Higgins, de Montes, 
Estourget, & Valencia, 2005). People’s level of confidence affects their propensities to 
conform or deviate by shaping their sense of control. People who are under-confident 
and pessimistic tend to perceive low levels of control—and those who are over-confident 
and optimistic tend to perceive high, sometimes delusional, levels of control—over their 
environments (Kahneman & Renshon, 2007). Proactivity researchers have long argued 
that perceived control over one’s environment is one predictor of why some people more 
so than others are likely to challenge the status quo (Grant & Ashford, 2008; Parker & 
Sprigg, 1999). The less people feel in control of their environments, the less likely they 
are to challenge the status quo—and the more they feel in control, the more likely they 
are to challenge the status quo (Bell & Staw, 1989). 
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 In sum, different regulatory schemas trigger different motivations: either the 
motivation for stability or the motivation for change (Kluger, Stephan, Ganzach, & 
Hershkovitz, 2004; Van-Dijk & Kluger, 2004). Prevention-focused individuals are more 
concerned with ensuring their safety and security—and are thus more sensitive to 
negative deviations from the status quo (differences between “0” and “-1”) (Herzenstein, 
Posavac, & Brakus, 2007; Higgins & Tykocinski, 1992). They would rather persist with 
nonnegative, satisfactory current states than risk shifting from the status quo and 
incurring losses (Chernev, 2004; Crowe & Higgins, 1997; Liberman, Idson, Camacho, & 
Higgins, 1999). Thus, employees who approach their decisions predominantly through 
prevention schemas are likelier to exhibit strong preferences to reinforce the status quo. 
Promotion-focused individuals are more concerned with searching for better possibilities 
and opportunities—and are thus more sensitive to positive deviations from the status 
quo (differences between “0” and “+1”) (Higgins, 2008). They are more willing to take 
risks to maximize and enhance current states (Zhang & Mittal, 2007). And the upside 
gains of challenging the status quo loom larger than the downside risks of doing so 
(Crowe & Higgins, 1997). Thus, employees who approach their decisions predominantly 
through promotion schemas are likelier to exhibit strong preferences to reject the status 
quo. 
Proposition 4: Employees who are predominantly prevention focused are more 
vulnerable to the risks of conformity biases. 
Proposition 5: Employees who are predominantly promotion focused are more 
vulnerable to the risks of deviation biases.  
 Propositions 4 and 5 inherently imply that regulatory schemas offset the risks of 
the opposing biases. That is, prevention states tamp down the risks of deviation biases 
and promotion states tamp down the risks of conformity biases (Scholer & Higgins, 
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2008). Prevention states preclude employees from inappropriately challenging the status 
quo and promotion states preclude employees from inappropriately conforming to the 
status quo. So employees who flexibly shift between prevention and promotion focused 
mindsets (as I predicted would occur under egalitarian-individualist and meritocratic-
collectivist systems) are essentially equipped to achieve an optimal level of self-
regulation: the advantages of each regulatory schema offset the disadvantages of the 
other (Rosenzweig, 2014; Scholer & Higgins, 2012).  
 What makes shifting between prevention and promotion states “optimal”? 
Research demonstrates that regulatory schemas fundamentally shape how we process 
our information worlds (Trope & Liberman, 2010). The more prevention focused we are, 
the more we process our environments concretely; we focus on the “trees” or low-level, 
micro details and obstacles  (Friedman & Förster, 2001; Lee & Higgins, 2009). Focusing 
on the concrete enables prevention focused individuals to achieve their goal of being 
vigilant—i.e., it enables them to reduce any potential for losses (Förster & Higgins, 
2005). But the more people focus on the concrete, the more vigilant and risk-averse they 
become (Liberman et al., 1999). They thus fall into the trap of being overly sensitive to 
the costs of change and overly insensitive to the costs of stability—and are likely to 
exhibit tendencies to maintain the status quo. 
 The opposite is true for promotion states. The more promotion focused we are, 
the more we process our environments abstractly; we focus on the “forest” or high-level, 
macro aspects and big picture (Semin et al., 2005). Focusing on the abstract enables 
promotion focused individuals to achieve their goal of growth—i.e., it enables them to 
not be bogged down by the details and look for ways to achieve advancement. But the 
more people focus on the abstract, the more eager and risk-seeking they become 
(Henderson, Trope, & Carnevale, 2006). They thus fall into the trap of being overly 
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sensitive to the costs of stability and overly insensitive to the costs of change—and are 
likely to exhibit tendencies to reject the status quo (Liberman et al., 2001). 
 However, people who fluidly shift between prevention and promotion states 
iterate between concrete and abstract processing modes. That is, they see how the 
concrete details fit into the abstract big picture—and how the abstract big picture puts 
the small details into context. For example, advertising executives who iterate between 
the concrete and abstract see how the concrete details of their advertisements (e.g., the 
actors they hire, the colors they use) help them satisfy global consumer demands—and 
how satisfying global consumer demands shapes how they should go about 
implementing the concrete details of their advertisements. As people iterate between the 
concrete and abstract, they also shift between prevention and promotion regulatory 
states, exacerbating or attenuating preferences for stability and change. Thus, people 
who shift between concrete and abstract processing modes—primed by shifts between 
prevention and promotion states—are uniquely positioned to explicitly wrestle with the 
pros and cons of conforming to or deviating from the status quo (Scholer & Higgins, 
2012). As such, compared to employees who fixate on either prevention or promotion 
states and on either the pros or cons of stability or change, employees who fluctuate 
between the regulatory states are better enabled to reduce the risks of both conformity 
and deviation biases.  
 Proposition 6: Employees who flexibly shift between prevention and promotion 
focused states are likely to simultaneously bring down the risks of both conformity and 
deviation biases. 
THE SELF-REINFORCING NATURE OF EGALIATIRAN-COLLECTIVIST AND 
MERITOCRATIC-INDIVIDUALIST SYSTEMS IN ORGANIZATIONS 
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 Egalitarian-collectivist and meritocratic-individualist cultural systems are 
congruent: they trigger the same psychological state. I argued that these congruent 
systems would either increase vulnerabilities to conformity biases—or deviation biases. 
However, incongruent cultural systems that trigger clashing states—egalitarian-
individualist or meritocratic-collectivist—would enable employees to bring down the 
risks of both biases to the degree possible. But, to what extent are egalitarian-
individualist or meritocratic-collectivist systems likely to be sustained in organizations? I 
argue that that the likelihood is low—and that there are strong social forces that push 
organizations towards congruity. Drawing on notions that social forces are bidirectional 
(Deutsch, 1985), I examine how collectivist-individualist systems are likely to give rise to 
their congruent egalitarian-meritocratic complements—and vice versa. As I will discuss 
in the last section of this article, the propositions that follow raise a number of 
interesting areas for future work on how incongruity, given its potential benefits, can be 
sustained over time.  
Collectivist/Individualist Systems Egalitarian/Meritocratic Systems 
 There are at least three different ways in which collectivist and individualist 
cultural systems shape the degree to which organizational administrators under these 
systems prefer implementing egalitarian vs. meritocratic distributive systems. First, 
collectivist and individualist systems affect the extent to which people believe one or the 
other distributive system is fundamentally fair. People in collectivist systems are more 
likely to attribute responsibility to external, uncontrollable causes (e.g., luck or chance) 
(Choi, Nisbett, & Norenzayan, 1999). And those who make external attributions are more 
sensitive to penalizing others for things outside their control. As such, research suggests 
that people who make external attributions prefer allocating resources in more 
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egalitarian ways (Mitchell, Tetlock, Mellers, & Ordonez, 1993). In their eyes, meritocratic 
systems may unfairly disadvantage people who suffer from bad luck. 
 By contrast, people in individualist systems adopt a more “Protestant work ethic” 
perspective—and see successes and failures as tightly coupled with effort, hard work, and 
other controllable causes (Miller, 1984; Morris & Peng, 1994; Newman, 1993). People 
who make internal attributions lean in the opposite direction: they are more sensitive to 
failing to reward people for achieving above and beyond. Thus, people who make 
internal attributions tend to prefer more meritocratic ways of distributing rewards 
(Skitka & Tetlock, 1992). In their eyes, egalitarian systems unfairly disadvantage people 
who simply contributed more—and fail to motivate effort among those who contribute 
less. 
 Second, collectivist and individualist systems affect the tradeoffs that people 
make between social harmony and productivity (Triandis, 1995), and tradeoffs in social 
harmony and productivity consequently shape distribution strategies (Deutsch, 1975; 
Meindl, 1989). For people in collectivist systems, solidarity and reducing conflict take 
center stage—and they are willing to trade off productivity (Casciaro & Lobo, 2005; 
Fiedler, 1967; Hofstede, 1980). Too much differentiation of rewards is likely to increase 
social conflict among people. Thus, to reduce this potential for conflict, people in 
collectivist systems are likely to prefer egalitarian systems (Bond, Leung, & Wan, 1982). 
But people in individualist systems are more concerned with increasing productivity—
and more willing to trade off social harmony (Triandis et al., 1998). They are therefore 
more attuned to individual accomplishments—and prefer to utilize meritocratic systems 
to reward those who accomplish a lot and penalize those who accomplish little (Kim, 
Park, & Suzuki, 1990). 
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 Third, collectivist and individualist systems affect the degree to which people are 
generous in their evaluations of others. Researchers have shown that people in 
collectivist systems are, on average, more generous than those in individualist systems 
(assuming the targets of evaluation are in their in-group, Gómez, Kirkman, & Shapiro, 
2000). In collectivist systems, people want to foster relationships over the long-term—
and see more benefits in evaluating people in a positive light (Hui, Triandis, & Yee, 
1991). By contrast, for people in individualist systems, these concerns of nurturing long-
term relationships are fairly negligible. Generosity in evaluations may, in turn, shape 
distributive structures. Because of their generosity, organizational administrators in 
collectivist systems are less likely to discriminate among people—i.e., their evaluations 
and subsequent allocation of rewards are likely to cluster together. However, 
organizational administrators in individualist systems are more likely to discriminate 
among people, naturally giving rise to a more hierarchal reward structure  
Proposition 7a: Organizational administrators who operate in organizations with 
collectivist systems are likely to implement more egalitarian distributive systems.  
Proposition 7b: Organizational administrators who operate in organizations with 
individualist systems are likely to implement more meritocratic distributive systems. 
Egalitarian/Meritocratic Systems  Collectivist/Individualist Systems  
 How organizations distribute rewards can also shape whether employees exhibit 
more collectivist or individualist behaviors and values, which consequently give rise to 
broader collectivist or individualist systems in the organization (Schneider, Goldstein, & 
Smith, 1995). Employees in egalitarian systems are inherently undifferentiated in terms 
of power. That is, one is not more dependent on the other for resources (Pfeffer, 1981b). 
When there are equal power relations, people tend to develop reciprocity norms: “each 
party’s contributions are tied to those of the other party’s” (Kabanoff, 1991: 423). In 
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reciprocity relationships, people tend to give back what they receive in order to retain a 
balance between the parties (Deutsch, 1985). As Kabanoff (1991) argues, people in 
reciprocity relationships may disagree about many issues such as how joint resources 
should be allocated toward completing tasks. But, for the most part, these disagreements 
occur within a relationship in which the parties value cohesiveness, pursue goals jointly, 
and work together rather than withdraw from the relationship to remedy sources of 
conflict (Pfeffer & Langton, 1988). All these attributes are reflective of more collectivist 
tendencies, suggesting that more collectivist systems of norms are likelier to arise from 
egalitarian systems. 
  The opposite occurs in meritocratic systems. Unequal distribution of rewards 
inherently begets unequal distribution of power. Much research on power hierarchies 
suggests that high relative power triggers a variety of different psychological processes 
and behaviors (Keltner, Gruenfeld, & Anderson, 2003; Magee & Galinsky, 2008). [Note I 
focus on people at the top of the power hierarchy because they are the ones who are the 
most influential in shaping the norms that emerge in organizations (Hollander, 1958)]. 
For one, people with greater power exert their independence from others, especially their 
subordinates—and, for better or worse, are more self-reliant (Kipnis, 1972). Additionally, 
people with greater power are likely to express their personal opinions (Anderson & 
Berdahl, 2002)—and are unfazed when others do the same (Galinsky, Magee, Gruenfeld, 
Whitson, & Liljenquist, 2008). Finally, power reduces the attention that people pay to 
other’s contributions (Kipnis, 1976), perspectives (Galinsky, Magee, Inesi, & Gruenfeld, 
2006), and overall emotions and thoughts (Overbeck & Park, 2006). Powerful people do 
this, though, only to the extent that others are not useful for achieving their goals. When 
people are useful, powerful managers attend to them quite closely (Gruenfeld, Inesi, 
Magee, & Galinsky, 2008; Overbeck & Park, 2001). Thus, the relationships here are 
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instrumental: others are viewed merely as a means to an end. Overall, the behaviors that 
managers exhibit in meritocratic systems are self-focused, exchange-oriented, and 
individualistic. And these individualistic norms at the top are likely to trickle down to the 
rest of the organization (Magee & Galinsky, 2008). 
Proposition 8a: Employees who operate in organizations with egalitarian distributive 
systems are likely to give rise to more collectivist systems.  
Proposition 8b: Employees who operate in organizations with meritocratic distributive 
systems are likely to give rise to more individualist systems.  
DISCUSSION 
 My objective in this chapter was to examine how different types of work contexts 
exacerbate or attenuate the risks of conformity and deviation biases. I argued that 
whereas congruent cultural systems (egalitarian-collectivist and meritocratic-
individualist) are likely to exacerbate vulnerabilities to the risk of either bias, 
incongruent cultural systems (egalitarian-individualist and meritocratic-collectivist) 
better enable employees to bring down the risks of both biases. Congruent systems 
position individuals at either end of a prevention-promotion continuum but incongruent 
systems prime individuals to flexibly shift between the regulatory states. Shifting 
between the regulatory states, in turn, tamps down the risks associated with gravitating 
towards either extreme. But I also argued that strong socio-normative forces strain 
organizations towards congruent systems that exacerbate vulnerabilities to one bias or 
the other.  
 As I noted at the onset, micro organizational behavior scholars to date have 
predominantly focused on reducing conformity biases while slighting the risks of 
deviation biases. In this vein, my theoretical framework provides a more balanced 
dialectic of the types of risks employees are exposed to in organizations. My framework 
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also contributes to a number of diverse literatures that span the micro-to-macro 
continuum—and leads researchers to a number of rewarding areas for future work. 
Theoretical Contributions 
 Systemic incongruity. Organizational psychologists have typically argued that 
work environments enhance individual-level performance when they are congruent—or 
send consistent signals about what behaviors are encouraged or discouraged. These work 
structures include norms, reward schemes, goals, training, and other managerial policies 
(Lee et al., 2004). For example, researchers have found that individuals perform better 
when their groups’ goal-setting strategies align with the groups’ socio-cultural values 
(Erez, 1986), training methods match cultural systems (Earley, 1994), management 
practices are consistent with broader cultural syndromes (Newman & Nollen, 1996), 
types of goals and feedback match the structure and demands of the task (Saavedra, 
Earley, & Van Dyne, 1993), and normative values mesh with rewards in high-
accountability organizations (Lee et al., 2004). Additionally, scholars examining the 
efficacy of single managerial practices—as opposed to combinations of managerial 
practices—have advocated for congruency. For instance, researchers studying goal-
setting have found that goal conflict decreases performance (Erez, Gopher, & Arazi, 
1990; Locke, Smith, Erez, Chah, & Schaffer, 1994)—and so do hybrid individual and 
group reward structures (Quigley, Tesluk, Locke, & Bortol, 2007; Wageman, 1995). 
 There have been a number of reasons advanced to explain why incongruent 
systems that send different cues result in poorer performance. First, incongruity 
engenders uncertainty and ambiguity about what is being rewarded or encouraged. Such 
uncertainty puts people in a bind (Argyris, 1982), decreasing their motivation to perform 
well (Vroom, 1964) and increasing their perception of unfairness (Lind & Tyler, 1988; 
Tetlock, 1999). Uncertainty can also induce performance-debilitating levels of tension 
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and anxiety (Argyris, 1990; Kahn, Wolfe, Quinn, Snoek, & Rosenthal, 1964; Leiter & 
Maslach, 1988). Second, incongruity often places employees in contexts that clash with 
their values, which decreases feelings of control and satisfaction (O'Reilly et al., 1991). 
Third, incongruity stretches people’s limited cognitive resources. As such, people tend to 
focus their attention on only one goal or objective when confronted with inconsistent 
signals (Barnes, Hollenbeck, Jundt, DeRue, & Harmon, 2011). 
 Macro scholars have also argued that congruity—or fit and similarity among 
organizational elements and strategy—is beneficial in enhancing performance at the 
organizational level of analysis (e.g., Kotter, 1980; Nadler & Tushman, 1980; Quinn & 
Hall, 1983). These scholars argue that incongruity can cause significant stresses and 
strains in the organization that dampen its ability to meet organizational goals (Roberts, 
2004), and sometimes even increases the hazards of organizational mortality (Hannan, 
Pólos, & Carroll, 2003). 
 My model does not necessarily challenge these macro theories; it qualifies them. 
If strategic decision makers (i.e., those who make the organizational design decisions) 
assess that the environment is particularly punitive towards conformity biases and are 
tolerant of incurring the risks of deviation biases, congruent meritocratic-individualist 
systems are perhaps the most beneficial. If strategic decision makers assess that the 
environment is particularly punitive towards deviation biases and are tolerant of 
incurring the risks of conformity biases, congruent egalitarian-collectivist systems are 
perhaps the most beneficial. However, to the extent that strategic decision makers 
cannot assess which bias the environment is more punitive towards—and are not willing 
to tolerate the risks of either bias—incongruent systems now become beneficial. 
Incongruity prevents employees from erring too much in one direction or the other. 
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 But my model does fundamentally challenge the more micro, psychological work 
on the debilitating effects of incongruity. Contrary to many micro scholars who argue 
that consistency and congruity is beneficial, I argue that incongruity can be beneficial in 
the instances noted above at the individual level. In this vein, my model falls in step with 
recent macro work on the benefits of inconsistent formal and informal organizational 
structures in increasing organizational ambidexterity (e.g., Gulati & Puranam, 2009). Of 
course, given the vast research that incongruity can be debilitating for individuals, the 
question that now remains is which types of individuals thrive or freeze under 
incongruity and which conditions enhance or debilitate the benefits of incongruity. I did 
note that the benefits of incongruity are likely to accrue in conditions under which there 
exists enough task certainty such that the tradeoff frontier can be pushed out (boundary 
conditions). But there certainly may be other considerations, and I return to this issue in 
the Future Directions section. 
 My model also draws closer attention to what constitutes managerial or employee 
“performance” in organizational behavior research. Many of the studies I cited, which 
advocate the benefits of congruity, adopt a generic conceptualization of task 
performance. My model adopts a more specific conceptualization of performance: the 
balance of opposing sets of risks. This reconceptualization has the advantages of 
capturing an important aspect of performance—balancing opposing risks are a 
fundamental problem of organizational life at all levels of analysis (Smith & Lewis, 2011).  
 Organizational culture and regulatory focus. My model also makes more 
specific contributions to the literatures on which it draws: organizational culture and 
regulatory focus. In the organizational culture literature, many scholars have noted that 
understanding how normative systems develop in organizations is deeply important—
but grossly under-theorized (e.g., Ehrhart & Naumann, 2004; Grant & Patil, 2012; Heath 
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& Sitkin, 2001). Whereas researchers have typically focused on the consequences of 
norms—e.g., the consequences of collectivist-individualist systems (Chatman & Barsade, 
1995) or equality-equity distributive systems (Goncalo & Kim, 2010), my discussion on 
how collectivist-individualist systems give rise to egalitarian-meritocratic systems—and 
vice versa—provides fresh insights into how cultural elements emerge in organizations 
(in congruent ways).  
 Additionally, most organizational psychologists to date have utilized the 
collectivist-individualist dimension to examine cultural differences in organizations (e.g., 
Chatman & Jehn, 1994; Earley & Gibson, 1998; Wagner, 1995). But integration of the 
horizontal-vertical dimension has been quite limited. The horizontal-vertical dimension 
has been largely restricted to cross-border studies that examine cultural differences at 
the national level (e.g., Bhagat, Kedia, Harveston, & Triandis, 2002). This oversight is 
unfortunate given the number of critics who have drawn attention to the limits of the 
collectivism-individualism construct (Schwartz, 1990)—and the number of scholars who 
have drawn attention to the benefits of the horizontal-vertical dimension in enhancing 
the precision of the construct (Triandis & Gelfand, 1998).  
 By importing the horizontal-vertical dimension to explain cultural differences at 
the organizational level, I have contributed in two significant ways. First, “camps” of 
scholars have emerged with some scholars supporting the organizational benefits of 
collectivist systems (e.g., Chatman et al., 1998; Kaplan, Brooks-Shesler, King, & Zaccaro, 
2009; Wagner, 1995) and others supporting the organizational benefits of individualist 
systems (e.g., Goncalo & Staw, 2006; Kanter, 1988; Sutton, 2002a). Integrating work on 
egalitarian and meritocratic systems provides one means of reconciling these arguments. 
The downside risks of collectivist systems are likely to be further exacerbated under 
egalitarian systems but offset under meritocratic systems. And the downside risks of 
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individualist systems are likely to be further exacerbated under meritocratic systems but 
offset under egalitarian systems. Second, the integration of the horizontal-vertical 
dimension increased the precision by which different types of cultural systems can be 
distinguished in organizations. And perhaps most importantly, I have drawn important 
theoretical links between these four types of cultural systems and an important puzzle in 
organizational life: balancing the risks of conformity and deviation biases. 
 For research on regulatory focus, my model sheds light on how situational factors 
restrict—or enable—employees to shift between prevention and promotion states. Social 
psychologists have previously argued that (a) both prevention and promotion regulatory 
states have their downside risks, and (b) placing situational constraints on these states 
optimizes self-regulation and performance (Higgins, 2011). But we know little about the 
types of situational variables that can constrain individuals. Scholer and Higgins (2012: 
79) state, “Exploring what factors…within environments make it more or less likely that 
the dual strength of the systems can be utilized is an important question that remains to 
be explored.” I take a step towards filling this gap by directly examining how different 
types of organizational cultural systems trigger different types of regulatory responses.  
  Identity construction: Optimal distinctiveness. Furthermore, my model 
contributes to issues of identity construction in organizations. Researchers argue that 
people strive for “optimal distinctiveness”—or aim to construct identities that allow them 
to simultaneously express their sense of distinctiveness and sense of assimilation 
(Brewer, 1991; Hornsey & Jetten, 2004; Lee & Tiedens, 2001). When people feel that 
they are too distinct—or too assimilated—they tend to disengage from the groups in 
which they are embedded (Brewer, 1993; Sedikides & Brewer, 2001). But beyond group 
engagement, we have a very limited understanding of what organizations can do to 
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better enable employees to construct identities that strike a balance between assimilation 
and distinctiveness (Grant, 2007: 407). 
 My model provides new insights in this arena. Collectivist and individualist 
systems differ in the extent to which they fulfill needs for assimilation and 
distinctiveness, with collectivist systems fulfilling needs for assimilation and 
individualist systems, needs for distinctiveness (Brewer & Gardner, 1996). Cultural 
emphases on interdependence trigger collective identities in which people’s personal self 
is subsumed into a broader collective self, whereas cultural emphases on independence 
trigger individual identities that bolster people’s personal self (Gardner, Gabriel, & Lee, 
1999). Egalitarian and meritocratic systems fulfill needs for assimilation and 
distinctiveness, respectively, in similar ways. Egalitarian systems are generally correlated 
with solidarity goals and meritocratic systems, personal goals (Chen, Meindl, & Hui, 
1998; Deutsch, 1975; Mannix, Neale, & Northcraft, 1995).  
 Building on these findings, the framework presented here suggests that 
employees are more likely to achieve optimal distinctiveness in egalitarian-individualist 
and meritocratic-collectivist systems. These organizational cultures enable employees to 
construct identities that neither stray too far in the direction of fitting in—nor stray too 
far in the direction of standing out. The framework also broadens the study of the 
consequences of achieving optimal distinctiveness. Previous research has focused, for 
example, on the consequences of optimal distinctiveness for group membership 
(Hornsey & Jetten, 2004) and success of change initiatives (Meyerson & Scully, 1995). 
My framework implicitly proposes that optimal distinctiveness can enhance the ability of 
individuals to reduce the risks of conformity and deviation biases. 
 Macro puzzles of balancing exploitation and exploration. Macro 
scholars have called for organizational psychologists to examine how individual-level 
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decisions can translate into organizational-level outcomes in terms of striking a balance 
between exploitation and exploration (e.g., Gibson & Birkinshaw, 2004; Mom, Van Den 
Bosch, & Volberda, 2009; Smith & Tushman, 2005). Lavie et al. (2010: 143) state, 
“Future research may be needed at the individual…levels to uncover the underlying 
processes at different levels of analysis that support the balancing of exploration and 
exploitation.” This article answers this call in at least two fundamental ways. 
 First, it provides a base framework for understanding how work contexts shape 
individuals’ abilities to cope with competing pressures to conform or deviate. Successes 
or failures in coping with conformity and deviation across individuals can translate into 
successes or failures of organizations in coping with fluctuating external environments 
(Meyer, 1982; Nelson & Winter, 1982). Specifically, it can translate into determining the 
degree to which organizations change too much or too less when attempting to align 
themselves with external environment demands (Zajac, Kraatz, & Bresser, 2000). 
Employees who exhibit conformity biases are likely to shift their organizations towards 
over-exploitation, or under-adaptation. Conformity biases across multiple employees 
within an organization dampens an organization’s pursuit of new practices and beliefs 
(Levinthal & March, 1993). On the other end, employees who exhibit deviation biases are 
likely to shift their organizations towards over-exploration, or over-adaptation. 
Deviation biases across multiple employees precludes organizations from stabilizing, 
refining, and implementing existing practices and beliefs (March, 1991). Given these 
assumptions, my model suggests that over-exploitation is likelier to occur in 
organizations with egalitarian-collectivist systems—and over-exploration in 
organizations with meritocratic-individualist systems. But organizations with 
egalitarian-individualist or meritocratic-collectivist systems are likely to more adeptly 
balance exploitation and exploration. 
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 However, this being said, researchers have argued that strategic decision making 
at the individual level does not always have its intended benefits at the organizational 
level (e.g., Beer & Eisenstat, 2000; Martin, 2010). In this vein, future research would not 
only have to test the links between organization cultural systems and organizational 
exploitation-exploration but also examine possible impediments in translating 
individual-level behaviors to organizational-level outcomes. My model provides the 
theoretical foundations from the micro perspective so that researchers can begin to build 
these micro-to-macro links. 
 Second, some macro scholars have argued that the relationship between 
conformity and deviation biases is zero-sum or hydraulic at the individual level. These 
scholars argue that due to bounded rationality and experienced goal conflict (Simon, 
1947), people can only sequentially allocate their attention to either reducing overt-
exploitation or reducing overt-exploration (Levinthal & March, 1993). That is, they have 
argued that employees who reduce the risks of conformity biases automatically elevate 
the risks of deviation biases—and employees who reduce the risks of deviation biases 
automatically elevate the risks of conformity biases (Adler et al., 1999; Lavie et al., 2010). 
These propositions at the individual-level likely stem from general assumptions that 
exploitation-exploration tradeoffs are zero-sum at the organizational-level (however for 
a counteragrument, see Farjoun, 2010). Because of this zero-sum relationship, 
organizations are thought to be able to balance exploitation and exploration through 
separation. For example, researchers have argued that organizations can achieve balance 
via three means of separation: organizational (separate work units dedicated to 
exploitation or exploration), temporal (sequential shifts between exploitation and 
exploration), and domain (exploiting in one domain and exploring in another) (Lavie et 
al., 2010). 
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 I did note that the relationship between conformity and deviation risks at the 
individual level may be hydraulic when high degrees of uncertainty lurk in employees’ 
task environments. My model also implicitly posits that the risks are zero-sum in 
egalitarian-collectivist systems (employees tamp down the risks of deviation biases but 
are exposed to the risks of conformity biases)—and in meritocratic-individualist systems 
(employees tamp down the risks of conformity biases but are exposed to the risks of 
deviation biases). But I also challenge the assumption that these risks are always zero-
sum; the risks are not necessarily zero-sum in the incongruent egalitarian-individualist 
and meritocratic-collectivist systems. Drawing from theories on regulatory focus 
(Scholer & Higgins, 2012), I predicted that employees would be able to simultaneously 
reduce both biases in these incongruent systems, given favorable task conditions. In 
essence, my model urges future researchers to examine when and to what degree 
employees can push out the conformity-deviation tradeoff function.  
Future Directions   
 My model proposed that collectivist-individualist systems naturally beget their 
congruent egalitarian-meritocratic counterparts—and vice versa (Propositions 8 and 9). 
These propositions complement recurring themes that organizations tend to exhibit 
strong tendencies toward homogenization (e.g., Schneider, Smith, Taylor, & Fleenor, 
1998). But these propositions do not account for why some organizations may break out 
of the self-reinforcing homogenization forces and embrace more complex strategies that 
satisfy competing demands (e.g., Gulati & Puranam, 2009; Wright & Snell, 1998). 
Indeed, my examples of kaizen in Toyota and IDEO serve as examples of real-world 
egalitarian-individualist and meritocratic-collectivist systems. The major question for 
future research concerns how and when incongruity can emerge and be sustained, such 
that the benefits of reducing both conformity and deviation biases are reaped. 
33 
 
 For example, given that incongruity can be psychologically harmful and 
cognitively depleting (e.g., Lee et al., 2004; O'Reilly et al., 1991), future research may 
benefit from examining the sustainability and benefits of “punctuated incongruity”: long 
intervals of congruity punctuated by short bursts of incongruity. That is, organizations 
may shift to incongruent combinations when both risks are no longer tolerated. As 
punctuated incongruity inherently involves internal organizational change, there are at 
least three contingencies that may affect the sustainability and benefits of punctuated 
incongruity. First, and most basically, organizational change is costly (Nickerson & 
Zenger, 2002). There are up-front costs involved in planning the change—and 
transitional losses in productivity as the change is implemented (Kanter, 1983). So the 
benefits of punctuated incongruity will accrue only to the degree that the benefits 
outweigh their costs. Second, some systems may be easier to shift than others. 
Organizational theorists have argued that formal work structures (normative social 
systems) can be more rapidly changed than informal work structures (emerging patterns 
of social interactions) (Gulati & Puranam, 2009). To the extent that egalitarian vs. 
meritocratic distributive systems constitute more formal structures—and collectivist vs. 
individualist cultural systems, more informal structures—it may be easier for 
organizations to shift distributive systems to achieve short intervals of incongruity. 
Third, members of an organization are usually more receptive to change initiatives when 
the initiatives are seen as legitimate. Perceptions of legitimacy are enhanced when 
individuals see change initiatives as instrumental to achieving internalized goals, 
conducive to their social identities and self-worth, and consistent with their moral and 
ethical values (Tost, 2011). 
 Future research may also benefit from examining potential sources of resistance 
to implementing punctuated incongruity. For instance, the ideologies of strategic 
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decision makers may be a source of resistance. Researchers argue that ideologies play a 
vital role in simplifying decision-making in stochastic environments (Barley & Kunda, 
1992)—and, more relevantly, can have powerful effects on the types of work structures 
and practices that strategic decision-makers prefer (Chin, Hambrick, & Trevino, 2013; 
Tetlock, 2000; Tetlock, Vieider, Patil, & Grant, 2013). In particular, we may be able to 
draw insights by examining political ideologies. Political ideologies are coherent sets of 
beliefs about how a collective should be structured (Tetlock et al., 2013).  
 In general, liberals tend to support structures that emphasize interdependence 
and equality (Haidt, 2007) whereas conservatives tend to support structures that 
emphasize independence and equity (Jost, Blount, Pfeffer, & Hunyady, 2003; Skitka & 
Tetlock, 1992). Therefore, we can expect liberal strategic decision makers to embrace 
egalitarian-collectivist systems and conservative decision makers, meritocratic-
individualist systems. Furthermore, value-monistic liberals and conservatives are at risk 
of falling prey to motivated-reasoning effects (Kunda, 1999; Tetlock, 2005). That is, 
liberal and conservative decision makers are unlikely to respond to feedback that their 
favored structures are causing adverse effects by overturning their favored structures 
(Tetlock et al., 2013). Instead, they are likely to experience moral aversion to shifting to 
incongruous structures (Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009), and instead attribute failures 
in their favored structures to external factors (Tetlock et al., 2013). Taken together, it is 
possible that liberal decision makers are more likely to bolster the self-reinforcing forces 
of egalitarian-collectivist systems and conservative decision makers, meritocratic-
individualist systems. And their values are likely to prevent them from shifting to periods 
of punctuated incongruity, even in the face of feedback that egalitarian-collectivist 
systems are exacerbating the risks of conformity biases or meritocratic-individualist 
systems are exacerbating the risks of deviation biases. 
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 However, strategic decision makers who hold more pluralistic ideologies—i.e., 
integratively complex mixes of liberal and conservative beliefs—may be more likely to 
break the self-reinforcing cycles and accommodate for periods of incongruity. Research 
suggests that people with more value pluralistic ideologies think in more cognitively 
complex ways, are self-critical, and more likely to resist motivating-reasoning effects 
(Tetlock, 1983b, 1989). Thus, these decision makers may see the value of meshing 
egalitarian systems with individualist cultures—or meritocratic systems with collectivist 
cultures. Additionally, strategic decision-makers with more value pluralistic ideologies 
may be more responsive to feedback that their employees are exhibiting strong 
tendencies in one direction or the other—and shift to periods of punctuated incongruity 
as necessary. 
 Finally, future research may benefit from examining the types of individuals who 
thrive and who freeze under periods of punctuated incongruity. For instance, individuals 
who strongly identify with their organizations—or internalize the organization’s values 
such that they become benchmarks for what defines appropriate behaviors (Ashforth & 
Mael, 1989)—are likely to be more receptive to changes from congruent to incongruent 
systems. Employees who are socially identified with their organizations typically see 
their organizational authorities as legitimate (Tyler, 1997), and therefore are less likely to 
resist change initiatives that are seen as benefiting the organization. Additionally, based 
on previous research, there may be dispositional factors that affect the degree to which 
individuals successfully cope with punctuated incongruity. As examples, individuals are 
likely to more successful cope when they have high tolerance for ambiguity (experience 
less anxiety in coping with contradictory demands, Budner, 1962), openness to 
experience (value intellectual curiosity, liberalism, and adventure, McCrae & Costa, 
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1985), and integrative complexity (able to reconile contradictory elements, Tetlock, 
Armor, & Peterson, 1994).   
Practical Implications 
 My model offers at least three major practical implications. First, my model alerts 
practitioners to the types of organizational cultures and structures that may be more 
successful in realizing improvements in the current tradeoff function. Needless to say, we 
live in an uncertain world. Thus, practitioners who gravitate towards consistently and 
continuously implementing egalitarian-collectivist or meritocratic-individualist systems 
may be leaving money on the table. These cultural systems allow employees to fall into 
the mindset that the best they can do is increase one set of risks in exchange for reducing 
the other set of risks. In the event a better tradeoff function exists, this assumption 
becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy: employees do not attempt to reach a better tradeoff 
function simply because they do not expect to do so.   
 Second, my model draws practitioners’ attention to the strong socio-normative 
forces that reinforce egalitarian-collectivist and meritocratic-individualist systems within 
organizations—systems that impede employees from improving tradeoff functions. It is 
important that practitioners note these forces and actively search for ways to counteract 
them when incongruity is necessary. As I discussed, fundamental values may be causing 
resistance to incongruity.  
 Third, my model informs practitioners that they do not necessarily have to shy 
away from placing their employees in contexts that trigger clashing psychological states. 
Humans have a remarkable ability to creatively and complexly cope with contradictory 
demands. Of course, this statement is more true for some people more so than for others. 
But complexly coping with contradictory demands can bring benefits for the 
organization. To ensure that these potential benefits are reaped, practitioners may 
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benefit by ensuring that incongruity is implemented in short intervals, perceived as 
legitimate, and implemented for employees who are particularly likely to thrive under 
such conditions. Additionally, practitioners may benefit from deploying resources to help 
employees in incongruent structures to develop their cognitive abilities to discern how 
and when to shift between regulatory states. As indicated in my model, it is not sufficient 
to merely shift between regulatory states. Employees must be equipped with fine-tuned 
cognitive abilities to fully realize the benefits that shifting between regulatory states can 
have in bringing down the risks of conformity and deviation biases.   
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CHAPTER 2 
BLENDING ACCOUNTABILITY AND CULTURAL SYSTEMS 
 
 Employees often have to decide whether to go with the status quo—or reject it 
(Morrison & Phelps, 1999; Nemeth & Staw, 1989; Sutcliffe & McNamara, 2001). The 
decision can be costly. Sometimes standard practices and beliefs are flawed and 
employees are better off relying on their unique insights (e.g., Burris, 2012; Mainemelis, 
2010; Staw & Boettger, 1990). In these situations, conforming to the status quo prevents 
employees from flexibly coping with fluctuating task demands (Grant & Ashford, 2008; 
Griffin et al., 2007). But sometimes standard practices and beliefs are “wiser” than any 
one individual and employees are better off simply conforming (e.g., Bonabeau, 2009; 
Dean & Sharfman, 1993; Peterson & Nemeth, 1996). In these situations, searching for 
better practices that do not exist can actually decrease the quality and reliability of 
decisions (Hackman & Wageman, 1995; March & Simon, 1958). 
 It is therefore important for scholars to understand the types of work 
environments that exacerbate the risks of conformity or deviation biases—or enable 
employees to simultaneously reduce both risks. Unfortunately our knowledge in this area 
is quite limited. It is limited because for several decades, organizational behavior 
researchers have focused on studying work contexts that encourage behaviors such as 
proactivity (Parker & Collins, 2010), creativity (Amabile, 1996; Shalley, Zhou, & Oldham, 
2004), creative deviance (Mainemelis, 2010), experimentation (Lee et al., 2004), and 
individual innovation (Scott & Bruce, 1994). All these behaviors involve reducing 
conformity biases (Grant & Ashford, 2008)—and in focusing near-exclusively on 
reducing conformity biases, organizational behavior scholars have lost sight of the risks 
of deviation biases and the question of how the opposing risks can be balanced in the 
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workplace. Consequently, the micro field has fallen behind its more macro counterpart 
which has long acknowledged that organizations have to balance the analogous risks of 
exploration and exploitation (Farjoun, 2010; Lavie et al., 2010; March, 1991). 
 To remedy this situation and strengthen our understanding of when and why 
individuals err in one direction or the other, I examine the interactive effects of two 
prevalent norm-enforcement systems in organizations: organizational culture and 
accountability. There are three reasons why I approach the focal question from this 
integrative perspective. First, research suggests that organizational culture (O'Reilly & 
Chatman, 1996; Schein, 1992b) and accountability systems (Lerner & Tetlock, 1999; 
Simonson & Nye, 1992; Tetlock, 1992) greatly shape what and how people in 
organizations think. As such, these contexts offer relevant insights into how work worlds 
can be engineered to enable people to make better decisions about conforming or 
deviating. Second, management scholars have argued that decision making is a 
byproduct of social and task functions (Fiedler, 1967; Katz & Kahn, 1978)—and, in this 
vein, organizational culture and accountability systems serve critical social and task 
functions, respectively (Johns, 2006). Organizational culture serves social functions by 
shaping how people relate to one another (Hofstede et al., 1990) whereas accountability 
systems serve task functions by enforcing performance standards (Katz & Kahn, 1966). 
Third, organizational culture and accountability systems are so intricately intertwined 
such that it is difficult to examine their effects on behavior in isolation of one another 
(Gelfand, Lim, & Raver, 2004). Consistent with combinational perspectives which state 
that a particular context can have certain effects when configured with one context but 
an opposite effect when configured with another (Lee et al., 2004; Meyer, Tsui, & 
Hinings, 1993), I will demonstrate that different combinations of cultural norms and 
accountability systems can have very different effects on behavior.  
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 Specifically, I show that decision makers fall prey to conformity or deviation 
biases when operating in combinations of cultural values and accountability systems that 
trigger the same patterns of thought. But decision makers are able to control exposure to 
both risks when operating in combinations that trigger clashing patterns of thought. 
Overall, this chapter provides fresh insights into the heavily under-researched study of 
balancing conformity and deviation risks, offers a way to offset the downside risks of 
different types of organizational cultures and accountability systems, and qualifies 
prevalent notions that work contexts that prime the same psychological states are 
beneficial (cf. Argyris, 1990; Locke et al., 1994; Wageman, 1995).  
CULTURAL VALUES AND ACCOUNTABILITY SYSTEMS:  
PUSHING TOWARDS AND AWAY FROM CONFORMITY AND DEVIATION 
The Risks of Conformity and Deviation Biases 
 As briefly described above, decision makers who exhibit conformity and deviation 
biases can incur large costs for themselves and their organizations. There are at least 
three reasons why conformity biases—or tendencies to consistently preserve or maintain 
the status quo—can be problematic. First, decision makers confront tasks whose 
demands are constantly in flux due to rapid technological advancements, global 
economic changes, and evolving consumer tastes. Sometimes it is difficult for established 
practices and beliefs to update fast enough to keep pace with these fluctuating task 
demands (Burns & Stalker, 1961; Leana & Barry, 2000). As such, employees who 
continuously conform to the status quo risk adhering to flawed work process and 
methods thereby dampening organizational functioning (Grant & Parker, 2009; 
Morrison & Phelps, 1999). Second, decision makers confront tasks that are plagued with 
uncertainty: there is low predictability among inputs, processes, and outcomes (Wall, 
Cordery, & Clegg, 2002). As such, organizations are limited in their abilities to formalize 
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work processes and methods for all possible situations that may arise (Murphy & 
Jackson, 1999). Employees who exhibit conformity biases may miss opportunities to 
utilize their own intuitions and unique capabilities to effectively cope with a given 
situation (Griffin et al., 2007). Third, sometimes established practices and beliefs may be 
simply flawed (Staw & Boettger, 1990). Some organizational members have a tendency to 
adopt management fads and fashions that are popular but not always useful or effective 
(Abrahamson, 1996). Employees who conform to these fads merely cause them to 
persist.  
 But there is also the risk of the less-acknowledged deviation bias—or tendency to 
continuously challenge or alter the status quo. Deviation biases can be just as costly. For 
one, as argued in emerging “wisdom of the crowd” research, sometimes standard 
practices and beliefs are simply more accurate than that which any one individual can 
generate (Bonabeau, 2009; Page, 2007; Surowiecki, 2004). Individuals have bounded 
cognitive capabilities (Simon, 1957)—and often fall prey to a host of well-documented 
cognitive biases that can debilitate decision making (Kahneman, 1973, 2011). As such, 
following the beliefs of the crowd can actually increase the reliability, predictability, and 
accuracy of decision making—and those who deviate may do so at their own peril 
(Sutcliffe & McNamara, 2001). Additionally, standard practices and beliefs can protect 
decision makers in uncertain task environments (March & Simon, 1958). Sometimes 
standard practices capture all key predictive regularities in the task environment 
(Hammond, 1995). And deviating from these practices can result in futile attempts to 
explain unexplainable variance (Arkes et al., 1986; Dean & Sharfman, 1996). Finally, 
standard practices and beliefs can help organizations meet the demands of the various 
stakeholders to whom they are accountable (O'Reilly, 1989; Tyler & Blader, 2005). For 
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instance, standard practices can help managers signal to scrutinizers that they are in 
compliance with broader socio-political values (Edelman, 1992; McEvoy, 2014).  
 How can work worlds be designed to enable decision makers to reduce the risks 
of conformity and deviation biases? For the reasons noted at the onset of this chapter, I 
focus on the interplay of organizational culture and accountability systems. 
Organizational Culture and Conformity and Deviation Biases 
 Organizational culture captures the values and norms that bind people within a 
collective, provide them with a lens through which they can interpret their surroundings, 
and direct their actions (Schein, 1992a; Trice & Beyer, 1993). Culture shapes—and is 
shaped by—how leaders lead (Schein, 2004), group members behave (Chatman & 
Barsade, 1995), and employees are socialized (Hofstede et al., 1990). Organizational 
psychologists have recognized the collectivism-individualism dimension as a central way 
in which organizational cultures can be distinguished (e.g., Chatman & Jehn, 1994; 
Earley, 1993; Goncalo & Staw, 2006). The collectivism-individualism dimension was 
initially used to explain cultural variance across nations (e.g., Hofstede, 1980; Triandis, 
1995). But scholars have noted that cultural frames are malleable: cultural values can be 
primed by influential elements of an individual’s immediate situation. As such, 
collectivist-individualist cultural patterns do not just exist at the national level 
(Brockner, 2003). They can also exist at lower levels including at the level of the 
organization or work group (e.g., Chatman & Jehn, 1994; Earley, 1993; Goncalo & Staw, 
2006). 
  Research suggests that the degree to which an organization or work group is 
collectivist or individualist can affect the degree to which people tend to conform or 
deviate. In general, people in collectivist organizations promote communal goals, 
interpersonal harmony, and group achievements (Chatman & Barsade, 1995)—and  view 
43 
 
themselves as inherently interdependent with one another (Gelfand et al., 2007). The 
opposite is true for more individualist organizations. People in individualist 
organizations promote individual goals, distinctiveness, and personal achievements—
and view themselves as inherently independent from one another (Earley & Gibson, 
1998). As such, people in collectivist settings tend to stake more conformist stances so as 
to not rock-the-boat and to avoid conflict whereas people in individualist settings tend to 
stake more deviant stances to express their unique ideas (Bond & Smith, 1996; Kitayama, 
Markus, & Lieberman, 1995). For these reasons, researchers have found that collectivist 
groups tend to be less creative than individualist groups: people in collectivist groups 
express a less diverse set of ideas and are less tolerant of competing viewpoints (Goncalo 
& Staw, 2006).  
We should therefore expect employees in collectivist organizations to be more 
vulnerable to the risks of conformity biases and employees in individualist organizations 
to be more vulnerable to the risks of deviation biases. But this hypothesis rests on the 
assumption that culture in organizations works in isolation of other work contexts. I 
propose that the effects of organizational culture on conformity and deviation biases can 
be offset by the organization’s accountability system. 
Offsetting the Effects of Organizational Culture via Accountability Systems   
 Accountability refers to the ways in which people are expected to justify or defend 
their actions and behaviors (Frink & Klimoski, 2004; Tetlock, 1985). One prominent 
distinction is between process versus outcome accountability (Patil, Vieider, & Tetlock, 
2013; Pitesa & Thau, 2013; Simonson & Staw, 1992). People accountable for processes 
are expected to justify and explain their thoughts, strategies, and efforts while making 
their final decisions (de Langhe, van Osselaer, & Wierenga, 2011; Siegel-Jacobs & Yates, 
1996; Slaughter, Bagger, & Li, 2006). People accountable for outcomes are only expected 
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to justify the end quality, accuracy, or consequences of their final decisions (Brtek & 
Motowidlo, 2002; Simonson & Staw, 1992). Intelligence agencies can place a greater 
emphasis on what analysts considered when making forecasts versus on the accuracy of 
their forecasts (Tetlock & Mellers, 2011b), hospitals, on how physicians made their 
diagnoses versus on patient recovery rates (Rubin, Pronovost, & Diette, 2001), and 
companies, on how salespeople go about making sales versus on final sales figures 
(Anderson & Oliver, 1987).   
 Research suggests that employees cope differently when under process vs. 
outcome systems. People accountable for processes do not have the luxury of defending 
decisions by pointing to their positive outcomes; they have to ensure that how they go 
about making their decisions will be judged as appropriate (Beu & Buckley, 2004). As 
such, people accountable for processes tend to refrain from challenging shared practices 
and beliefs (Patil et al., 2013; Tetlock, Skitka, & Boettger, 1989). Shared practices and 
beliefs reflect widely-held notions about what is appropriate and legitimate (Feldman & 
March, 1981; Langley, 1989)—and therefore there is a low risk of losing rewards and 
status if employees conform to them (Parker et al., 2010).  
 By contrast, people accountable for outcomes are incentivized to maximize the 
end returns of decisions (Siegel-Jacobs & Yates, 1996). For better or for worse, there is 
little incentive to pay attention to how they go about actually delivering the results 
(Schweitzer, Ordonez, & Douma, 2004). Standard practices and beliefs are meaningless 
to employees under outcome systems to the extent that they do not offer them the means 
to maximize outcomes. As such, decision makers accountable for outcomes are likely to 
deviate from standard practices in search for better outcomes even when these practices 
are appropriate for a given task (Arkes et al., 1986).   
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 This discussion suggests that individuals are likely to become more vulnerable to 
the risks of conformity biases when operating under combinations of collectivist values 
and process systems. Using the language of Lewinian force fields in social psychology 
(Lewin, 1951), collectivist values and process systems are driving forces that push 
individuals in the direction of conformity. But the risks of conformity biases should be 
attenuated when process systems are replaced by outcome systems. Here, outcome 
accountability serves as a restraining force against the conformity tendencies exhibited 
under collectivist cultures. A similar pattern emerges for individualist norms. Individuals 
are likely to become more vulnerable to the risks of deviation biases when individualist 
values are coupled with outcome systems—both forces push individuals in the direction 
of deviation. But the risks of deviation biases should be attenuated when process systems 
are embedded in individualist settings instead. Now, process accountability counteracts 
the deviation tendencies exhibited under individualist values. 
Hypothesis 1: Accountability moderates the effects of cultural values on 
vulnerabilities to the risks of conformity or deviation biases such that: (a) the 
risks of conformity biases under collectivist values is exacerbated (attenuated) 
when they are coupled with process (outcome) systems, and (b) the risks of 
deviation biases under individualist values is exacerbated (attenuated) when 
they are coupled with outcome (process) systems. 
 I tested Hypothesis 1 in a laboratory experiment. I chose a laboratory 
methodology so I could reduce the post hoc ergo propter hoc fallacy: observers assume 
what the right action should have been based on ex-post outcomes (Fischhoff, 1975). In 
other words, if a decision maker conforms and returns a negative outcome, observers 
tend to conclude that she should have deviated—and if a decision maker deviates and 
returns a negative outcome, observers tend to conclude that she should have conformed. 
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But we know that in the real world, task environments are stochastic. Stochastic 
environments can punish decision makers who make the right decision—or reward 
decision makers who make the wrong decision (Mauboussin, 2012). Thus, in hindsight, 
we can draw erroneous conclusions about what should have been done (Bertrand & 
Mullainathan, 2001). A laboratory methodology reduces this fallacy by enabling me to: 
(a) control decision makers’ exposure to the risks of conformity and deviation biases, and 
(b) determine ex-ante the extent to which better outcomes can or cannot be achieved 
above and beyond what can be achieved via current group practices and beliefs.  
STUDY 1: METHODS 
 Study 1 utilizes a multiple cue probability (MCPL) paradigm (Brunswik, 1943; 
Hammond, 1955). The MCPL paradigm is widely used in studies of accountability 
(Ashton, 1992; Hagafors & Brehmer, 1983), judgment and decision making (Brehmer, 
1973; Mellers, 1980), and learning (Gluck & Bower, 1988; Knowlton, Squire, & Gluck, 
1994). In this study, participants predicted the performance of applicants to their 
university. The experiment was a 2 (Culture: collectivist vs. individualist) by 2 
(Accountability: process vs. outcome) by 2 (Risk exposure: conformity vs. deviation bias) 
between-subjects factorial design. Because of the limited research on balancing the risks 
of conformity and deviation biases, I adopted a more controlled operationalization of 
conformity and deviation as dichotomous and manipulated risk exposure in addition to 
culture and accountability. Thus, there were two different experimental conditions: one 
in which the correct response is to deviate according to some normative standard and the 
other in which the correct response is to conform. I fully acknowledge that in the real 
world, decision makers can be exposed to both risks at the same time and can adopt 
some blend of conformity and deviation, but to begin establishing the groundwork for 
studying conformity and deviation risks, I opted for experimental control. 
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Sample, Design, and Procedures 
 
 Two hundred and nine students at a private East Coast university participated in 
this study (64% female). They were recruited by the university’s behavioral lab in 
exchange for $10. Participants were randomly assigned to one of the eight conditions in 
which they were led to believe they would be helping their university’s admissions office 
predict the performance of applicants to their university. For each applicant, they were 
(a) provided ratings on three skill sets (Academic Performance, Extracurricular 
Involvement, and Communication Skills), (b) asked to predict the applicant’s 
performance, and (c) shown the applicant’s actual performance according to university 
records.  
 Each of the three ratings (or cues) for each applicant were provided on a 9-point 
scale, ranging from “very weak” (1) to “very strong” (9). The applicants were presented in 
randomized order. Academic Performance and Extracurricular Involvement assumed 
one of three values (1, 5, 9) and Communication Skills assumed one of two levels (1, 9). 
These three skill sets were combined factorially and repeated three times with different 
feedback (or criterion values) on repetitions based on whether participants were exposed 
to the risks of conformity or deviation biases. This 3 x 3 x 2 factorial design repeated 
three times generated 54 trials. I capped the number of trials at 54 because research 
suggests that people’s cognitive performance tends to plateau around 50 trials (see 
Hammond & Summers, 1972: 66). Participants made their performance predictions for 
each of the 54 applicants on a 9-point scale ranging from “very low performance” (1) to 
“very high performance” (9). Figure 2 maps the step-by-step procedures of this study and 
the cue-criterion pairing.  
Manipulations  
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 Culture manipulations. Participants were led to believe that they would be 
presenting their predictions to two group members who were assigned to them. I 
manipulated the culture of these fictitious groups in two steps. First, I told them that 
their groups had the same values described in a fictitious Harvard Business Review 
article I provided. The HBR article was presented as one in which an eminent 
organizational psychologist explained three critical factors that distinguished successful 
from unsuccessful groups. In the collectivist conditions, the HBR article, entitled “What 
Makes Groups Successful? Loyalty, Cohesion, and Finding Common Ground” argued 
that group members should accept norms, cooperate with each other, and protect the 
interests of the group. In the individualist conditions, the article, entitled “What Makes 
Groups Successful? Independence, Dissent, and Open Expression of the Individual,” 
argued that group members should question norms, compete with each other, and 
protect their own interests. Figure 3 displays these fictitious HBR articles.  
 Second, I asked participants to (a) describe three ways in which they could 
exhibit the same values as their group members (adapted from Trafimow, Triandis, & 
Goto, 1991), and (b)  explain why it was important to exhibit each of these attributes 
(adapted from Goncalo & Staw, 2006).   
 I created a three-item scale as part of the manipulation check, with lower 
numbers reflecting collectivist norms and higher numbers, individualist norms. 
Participants were asked to rate on an 8-point scale (“disagree strongly” to “agree 
strongly”) the extent to which they thought their group members believed in (1) 
“challenging group norms”; (2) “promoting group harmony” (reverse-coded); (3) 
“protecting their own interests” (α = .99). 
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 Accountability manipulations. The process and outcome accountability 
manipulations were consistent with previous studies (e.g., Brtek & Motowidlo, 2002; de 
Langhe et al., 2011; Siegel-Jacobs & Yates, 1996; Simonson & Staw, 1992; Slaughter et 
al., 2006). All participants were told that their $10 compensation for the study was 
contingent on the researchers’ evaluation of their performance and were asked to sign a 
consent form granting the researchers permission to interview them at the end of their 
task. In the process accountability conditions, participants were told that that the 
researchers would evaluate them based on how they went about making their decisions 
(i.e., the strategies they used to combine information about applicants to arrive at their 
final predictions) rather than on whether their predictions were ultimately accurate. In 
the outcome accountability conditions, participants were told that they would be 
evaluated only on the accuracy of their predictions rather than on how they went about 
their decisions.  
 I created a four-item scale as part of the accountability manipulation check, with 
lower numbers reflecting process accountability and higher numbers, outcome 
accountability. Anchors for the 8-point bipolar rating scale were: (1) “I believe I will be 
evaluated on the decision making strategies I utilized (and not on the accuracy of the 
outcomes)” and “I believe I will be evaluated on the accuracy of our final predictions 
(and not on the decision making strategies we utilized)”; (2) “The researchers will ask me 
to explain the decision making strategy I used to make my final predictions” and “The 
researchers will ask me to explain why my final predictions are right or wrong”; (3) “The 
researchers are more concerned with how I made my decisions and the effectiveness of 
my decision making strategies” and “The researchers are more concerned with whether 
my predictions are ultimately right or wrong”; (4) “Even if my predictions are inaccurate, 
I may still be evaluated favorably if I can defend the strategies that I used” and “Even if I 
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can defend the strategies I used to make my decisions, I will still be evaluated 
unfavorably if my final decisions are ultimately wrong” (α = .98). 
 Risk exposure manipulations. All participants were told that the decision 
rules used by their group in the previous session were 50%, 50%, and 0% for Academic 
Performance, Extracurricular Involvement, and Communication Skills, respectively (this 
information defined “group practices”). In the conditions that exposed participants to 
the risks of conformity biases, the group’s 50-50-0 weighting strategy was inadequate—
and the predictability of the environment was high (multiple correlation between cues 
and criterion was .93). The optimal weighting strategy for this cue-criterion 
configuration was 30%, 30%, and 40% (which was not disclosed to them). Thus, 
participants who used the 50-50-0 strategy would perform worse than those who 
deviated and learned the optimal 30-30-40 strategy. “Performance” was measured via 
achievement scores, calculation of which will be explained in the next section.  
 In the conditions that exposed participants to the risks of deviation biases, the 
50-50-0 weighting strategy was adequate—and the predictability of the environment was 
lower (multiple correlation = .54). In other words, the 50-50-0 strategy allowed decision 
makers to perform at the optimal forecasting frontier. No variance could be explained 
beyond what this strategy captured. Thus, participants who conformed to the 50-50-0 
strategy would perform better than those who deviated. 
STUDY 1: RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 To test if the manipulations had the desired effects, I ran a 2 x 2 x 2 multivariate 
analysis of variance (MANOVA) on the culture and accountability manipulation checks. 
There was a significant effect of the culture manipulation on the cultural norms check, (F 
(1, 209) = 17870.54, p < .001). The collectivist conditions differed from the individualist 
conditions (M = 1.10 vs. M = 7.74), (t (101) = -134.35, p < .001). There was also a 
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significant main effect of the accountability manipulation on the respective check, (F (1, 
209) = 1801.98, p < .001). The process accountability conditions differed from the 
outcome conditions (M = 1.23 vs. M = 7.28 = 1.34), (t (100) = -38.88, p < .01). No other 
effects were significant. 
 To recap, Hypothesis 1 stated that group culture and accountability would 
interact such that (a) combinations of collectivist values and process accountability 
would exacerbate the risks of conformity biases but combinations of collectivist norms 
and outcome accountability would attenuate the risks, and (b) combinations of 
individualist values and outcome accountability would exacerbate the risks of deviation 
biases but combinations of individualist norms and process accountability. I tested 
Hypothesis 1 in three ways. 
 First, consistent with most MCPL studies (e.g., Hagafors & Brehmer, 1983), I 
calculated participants’ achievement scores using the lens model (Brunswik, 1952). The 
achievement score, ra, is the correlation between the subject’s responses and criterion 
values. It is calculated as the product of three components: Re, the multiple correlation 
between the cues and criterion, Rs, the multiple correlation between the cues and the 
participants’ responses, and G, the matching index or the correlations between 
predictions of the two models. Table 1 displays the means and standard deviations of 
these measures. 
 I ran a 2 x 2 Accountability by Group Culture factorial ANOVA of achievement 
scores for both environments (risk of conformity bias:  F (1, 100) = 5.07, p < .05, η2 = 
.05; risk of deviation bias: F (1, 101) = 4.31, p < .05, η2 = .04). Figure 4 plots these 
interactions. When exposed to the risks of conformity biases, participants in collectivist 
values/ process accountability had lower achievement scores than those in collectivist 
values/ outcome accountability (M = .60 vs. M = .69), (F (1,100) = 15.73, p < .001). 
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When exposed to the risks of deviation biases, participants in individualist values/ 
outcome accountability had lower achievement scores than those in individualist values/ 
process accountability (M = .14 vs. M = .23), (F (1,101) = 28.53, p < .001). Outcome 
accountability offset the conformist tendencies under collectivist values—and process 
accountability offset the deviant tendencies under individualist values.  
 Second, I looked more closely at the weighting strategies that participants used to 
gain deeper insights into the extent to which they were conforming to or deviating from 
the group’s 50-50-0 weighting strategy. Figures 5 and 6 show (a) mean predictions of 
applicants constructed from the factorial design of Academic Performance (AP; levels 1, 
5, 9) by Extracurricular Involvement (EI; levels 1, 5, 9) by Communication Skills (CS; 
levels 1, 9), and (b) ideal predictions if participants used the optimal weights (grey lines 
with no markers). Figures 5 and 6 refer to the conformity and deviation risk conditions, 
respectively. In each panel, predictions are plotted as a function of AP and the slopes of 
these lines reflect its weight. Each separate line reflects each level of EI and the spaces 
between these lines reflect its weight. Intercept shifts from the left to right of each panel 
show the weight of CS.  
 In Figure 5, we see that participants in collectivist values/ process accountability 
overweighted AP (steeper slopes), overweighted EI (larger spaces between the lines), and 
assigned minimal weight to CS (no upward shift from left to right) (Panel A). They barely 
deviated from the group’s 50-50-0 weighting practice. Participants in the other 
conditions were closer to the ideal 30-30-40 weighting strategy (Panels B-D). They 
reduced the weight of AP (flatter slopes), reduced the weight of EI (smaller spaces 
between the lines), and increased the weight of CS (upward intercept shift). In Figure 6, 
we see that participants in individualist values/ outcome accountability underweighted 
AP and EI (flatter slopes and smaller spaces) and overweighted CS (upward intercept 
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shifts) (Panel H). This time, these participants were less aligned with the ideal 50-50-0 
strategy. All other participants in the remaining three conditions assigned greater weight 
to AP and EI (steeper slopes and larger spaces) and minimal weight to CS (no upward 
shift in lines) (Panels E-G).  
 To quantify these observations, I directly calculated participants’ cue-weighting 
strategies by (a) regressing the cue structure against each participant’s predictions to 
obtain the unstandardized coefficients and (b) converting these coefficients to 
percentages by dividing each by the sum of the three. Figure 7 displays the percentages 
across conditions with the upper and lower panels corresponding to the exposure to 
conformity and deviation risk conditions, respectively. When exposed to the risks of 
conformity biases, participants in collectivist values/ process accountability conformed 
most closely to the 50-50-0 weighting strategy, giving CS a weight of only 10%. When 
exposed to the risks of deviation biases, participants in individualist values/ outcome 
accountability incorrectly deviated from the ideal 50-50-0 weighting strategy, giving CS 
a weight of about 20%. But across both risk conditions, participants conformed when 
appropriate—and deviated when appropriate—in conditions in which the accountability 
system offset the risks of the cultural norms  
 Finally, I examined participants’ learning over the course of the randomized 
trials. The trials were first re-sorted in the order the participant received the cue-
criterion pairs. I then calculated the absolute difference between each participant’s 
prediction and the ideal prediction for each of the 54 trials. Next, I averaged the absolute 
differences within each experimental condition and plotted the differences as a function 
of trials in Figure 8. The upper panel refers to the risk of conformity bias conditions—
and the lower panel, risk of deviation bias conditions.  
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 Looking at the upper panel, participants in collectivist values/ process 
accountability fell between 1.0 and 1.6 deviations from the ideal. However, when exposed 
to the risks of deviation biases (lower panel), participants in individualist values/ 
outcome accountability wildly fluctuated as they tried to explain unexplainable variance. 
Their deviations from the ideal ranged anywhere from .9 to 2.1 points—and they never 
quite closed the performance gap compared to the other conditions. But, again, across 
both risk conditions, participants learned when to conform and when to deviate in 
conditions in which the accountability system offset the risk of cultural values (i.e., 
collectivist values/ outcome accountability, individualist values/ process accountability). 
In the upper panel, their deviations fell between .7 and 1.2 (collectivist values/ outcome 
accountability) and .7 and 1.3 (individualist values/ process accountability). In the lower 
panel, their deviations fell between .6 and 1.5 (collectivist values/ outcome 
accountability) and .5 and 1.55 (individualist values/ process accountability). 
 In sum, analysis of participants’ achievement scores, weighting strategies, and 
learning over time fully supported Hypothesis 1. Incongruent blends of accountability 
systems offset the risks of cultural values. The risks of conformity biases were 
exacerbated in blends of collectivist values and process accountability but the risks were 
reduced when individuals operated instead under outcome accountability. On the other 
end, the risks of deviation biases were exacerbated in blends of individualist values and 
outcome accountability but the risks were dampened under process accountability. 
 In the next chapter, I will explore the cognitive processes underlying these blends 
of cultural values and accountability systems which can explain why these blends have 
these reported effects on conformity and deviation. I will also present a second 
experiment that replicates Hypothesis 1, corrects for the weaknesses of Study 1, and tests 
these additional hypotheses about cognition.   
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CHAPTER 3 
SHIFTING BETWEEN THE CONCRETE AND ABSTRACT 
 
 Research on cultural values (Oyserman & Lee, 2008; Schneider, Ehrhart, & 
Macey, 2013) and accountability (Lerner & Tetlock, 1999; Tetlock, 1983a) suggests that 
both contexts fundamentally shape what and how individuals think. Cognition, 
therefore, may explain why different combinations of cultural and accountability systems 
have different effects on employees’ conformity or deviation responses. Construal level 
theory in social-cognitive psychology (CLT; Liberman & Trope, 1998; Trope & Liberman, 
2003, 2010) offers relevant insights into these types of cognitions. 
Construal Level Theory: A Brief Overview 
CLT posits that decision makers can focus their attention on the more concrete or 
more abstract aspects or elements of their decisions (Trope & Liberman, 2010). Note 
that consistent with well-established research on the capacity limits on human attention 
and on the amount of information people can process per unit of time (Kahneman, 
1973), CLT scholars argue that is probably impossible for humans to focus on both 
vantage points at the same time (Trope & Liberman, 2010).  When decision makers focus 
on the concrete aspects, they fixate on the “nitty-gritty” details—the trees that can only 
be seen up close (Liberman, Trope, & Stephan, 2007b). Concrete frames include the 
subordinate and incidental features—and component parts—of a decision (Liberman & 
Trope, 2008). When decision makers focus on the abstract aspects, they focus on the 
“big picture”—the forest that can only be seen from afar (Fiske & Taylor, 1991; Medin & 
Smith, 1984). By contrast, abstract frames include the superordinate and central 
features—or the primary gist of a decision (Smith & Trope, 2006). For example, Magee, 
Milliken, and Lurie (2010) examined people’s reactions to the tragic events of 9/11. 
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Concrete processors focused on the details of the victims and the number of emergency 
respondents at the scene whereas abstract processors focused on national security, 
macro-economic issues, and international relations. 
Note that the differences between concrete and abstract processing do not 
necessarily reflect differences in vagueness (Bar-Anan, Liberman, & Trope, 2006; 
Liberman, Trope, & Stephan, 2007a). The abstract elements of a decision do tend to be 
more simplistic and omit incidental, specific, and idiosyncratic details. But they also 
contain additional information about the value of an object and its broader relation 
among other stimuli (Trope & Liberman, 2010). For instance, when people abstractly 
construe a “poodle” as a “mammal,” they place it in the larger context of living things and 
thereby implicitly differentiate mammals from other life forms. 
Cultural Values, Accountability Systems, and Concrete-Abstract Processing 
As I argued in Hypothesis 1, people in collectivist settings are reluctant to “rock 
the boat” because they see themselves as interdependent with one another and are 
concerned with maintaining harmony (Bond & Smith, 1996; Goncalo & Staw, 2006; Lee 
et al., 2000). Not rocking the boat involves a degree of vigilance. People have to carefully 
monitor their behaviors to avoid social disapproval and fit in  (Lalwani et al., 2009; Van 
Baaren et al., 2003). They are also especially sensitive to their duties and obligations 
(Cross et al., 2002). For these reasons, researchers have found that people in collectivist 
settings tend to adopt prevention-of-losses mindsets: they are inspired by role models 
who emphasize avoiding failures (Lockwood et al., 2005) and are more concerned with 
minimizing losses than maximizing gains (Hamilton & Biehal, 2005).  
Employees are likely to become more vigilant when they are in a collectivist 
organization and also accountable for processes. People under process systems do not 
have the luxury of defending their decisions by pointing to their positive outcomes; they 
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have to ensure how they go about making their decisions will be judged as appropriate. 
As such, researchers have argued that people accountable for processes tend to be more 
risk averse and concerned with minimizing losses (Eisenhardt, 1985; Lerner & Tetlock, 
1999; Pitesa & Thau, 2013). They are motivated to cross all their t’s and dot all their i’s. 
 Vigilant people in turn tend to process their information worlds more concretely 
(Friedman & Förster, 2001; Lee & Higgins, 2009). Concrete processing enables vigilant 
people to fulfill their goal of being prevention focused: focusing on the details and micro-
level obstacles enables them to eliminate any threats to security and any potential for 
losses (Förster & Higgins, 2005). As such, we would expect individuals operating in 
blends of collectivist values and process accountability to be particularly focused on the 
concrete aspects of their decisions.  
 The opposite patterns emerge in individualist settings. Because people in 
individualist settings see themselves as independent and strive to be distinct, they are 
more concerned with self-enhancement goals (Lalwani & Shavitt, 2009). A 
preoccupation with self-enhancement goals causes them to be on the prowl for ways to 
maximize potential gains (Lalwani et al., 2009). Reflective of promotion-of-gains 
mindsets, people in individualist settings are more motivated by success than failure 
feedback (Heine et al., 2001) and more sensitive to success-foregone events (not 
winning) than failure-avoidance events (not losing) (Lee et al., 2000). 
 Employees are likely to be even more eager to maximize gains when operating in 
an individualist organization that also holds its employees accountable for outcomes. 
Outcome accountability can increase the boldness and risk-seeking propensities of 
employees (Sitkin, See, Miller, Lawless, & Carton, 2011). For better or for worse, 
outcome accountability inherently incentivizes maximization of outcomes (Siegel-Jacobs 
& Yates, 1996). For these reasons, some have argued that outcome systems are 
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advantageous for increasing innovation—outcome systems fire up employees to explore 
the unexplored (Coyne, 1997; Simons, 2005; Tetlock & Mellers, 2011b). Some have also 
argued that because outcome accountability increases propensities to take risks, people 
under these systems are likelier to engage in behaviors that cross ethical lines (Ordóñez, 
Schweitzer, Galinsky, & Bazerman, 2009; Pitesa & Thau, 2013; Schweitzer et al., 2004).      
 Eager, risk-seeking individuals in turn process their information worlds more 
abstractly (Semin et al., 2005). Again, the type of processing aligns with the goals of the 
individual. Abstract lenses that focus people on the big picture prevent them from being 
bogged down by the details in their pursuit of maximizing gains (Förster & Higgins, 
2005). Focusing on the concrete, micro details would only preclude them from achieving 
their goals of growth and accomplishment. Based on these arguments, I expect decision 
makers operating in blends of individualist values and outcome accountability to be 
particularly focused on the abstract aspects of their decisions. 
 Up to this point, I have only discussed congruent combinations of cultural values 
and accountability systems—those that fixate decision makers on either concrete or 
abstract vantage points. But things become more complex under the incongruent 
combinations: collectivist values / outcome accountability and individualist values / 
process accountability. In these combinations, one system pushes decision makers 
towards the concrete and the other, towards the abstract.  
 I introduce the construct, construal shifting, to describe the patterns of thought I 
hypothesize will emerge under these incongruent combinations. Construal shifting refers 
to the extent to which decision makers iterate between the concrete and abstract. Weak 
construal shifters look only at the concrete or the abstract (as I predicted would 
respectively occur under collectivist values / process accountability and individualist 
values / outcome accountability). But strong construal shifters consider how the micro 
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details of a decision fit into the bigger picture—and how the big picture puts the micro 
details into context. For example, advertising executives who iterate between the 
concrete and abstract see how the concrete details of their advertisements (e.g., the 
actors they hire, the colors they use) help them satisfy global consumer demands—and 
how satisfying global consumer demands shapes how they should go about 
implementing the concrete details of their advertisements. 
 Note that the concept of construal shifting as I define it does not violate 
assumptions about the limited ability of humans to simultaneously fixate on the concrete 
and the abstract during a single point in time. As I discussed above, CLT scholars have 
argued that it is probably impossible for humans for focus on both vantage points  
(Trope & Liberman, 2010). By contrast, I define construal shifting as a cross-time 
construct that requires shifting attentional focus—in a disciplined manner—over a 
broader span of time.  
Hypothesis 2. Accountability moderates the effects of cultural values on 
construal shifting such that: (a) construal shifting is stronger (weaker) under 
collectivist values when coupled with outcome (process) systems, and (b) 
construal shifting is stronger (weaker) under individualist values when coupled 
with process (outcome) systems.  
Construal Shifting and the Risks of Conformity and Deviation Biases 
 The degree to which decision makers focus near-exclusively on the concrete or 
the abstract can in turn affect their susceptibilities to conformity and deviation biases.  
Essentially, weak construal shifters are likely to demonstrate rather monistic preferences 
for either conforming or deviating. The more people process their information 
concretely, the more they are made aware of potential obstacles (De Dreu, 
Giacomantonio, Shalvi, & Sligte, 2009)—and the further risk-averse and vigilant they 
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become. Much research suggests that prevention focused managers are especially 
sensitive to negative deviations from the status quo  (differences between “0” and “-1”) 
(Herzenstein et al., 2007; Higgins & Tykocinski, 1992). In other words, they are more 
attentive to the costs vs. pros of change—and thus would rather persist with nonnegative, 
satisfactory current states than risk shifting from the status quo and incurring losses 
(Chernev, 2004; Crowe & Higgins, 1997; Liberman et al., 1999). In general, stability 
rather than change is more preferable for the prevention focused employee (Liberman et 
al., 1999).  
 On the other end, the more people process information abstractly, the more eager 
and risk-seeking they become. Concrete obstacles become largely inaccessible to people 
who process their environments abstractly, so they become more and more obsessed 
with maximizing gains (Henderson et al., 2006). Promotion focused individuals are 
more sensitive to positive deviations from the status quo (differences between “0” and 
“+1”) (Higgins, 2008). They are more attentive to the pros vs. cons of change. For the 
promotion focused individual, the upside gains of challenging the status quo loom larger 
than the downside risks of doing so (Crowe & Higgins, 1997). Hence, change rather than 
stability is more preferable (Liberman et al., 2001).  
 Because of these single-minded preferences for change vs. stability, I expect that 
congruent combinations of collectivist values / process accountability and individualist 
values / outcome accountability will increase susceptibilities to conformity or deviation 
biases, respectively, because they induce weaker levels of construal shifting.  
 However, strong construal shifters are in a unique position to wrestle with the 
pros and cons of conforming or deviating—and are likely to take a more broad-minded 
approach to making the decision. When people iterate between concrete and abstract 
modes, the benefits of deviation that are otherwise inaccessible are now accessible. And 
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when people shift from abstract to concrete modes, the benefits of conformity that are 
otherwise inaccessible are now accessible. Essentially, whereas employees under 
congruity are pushed into either zones of conformity or zones of deviation, employees 
under incongruity more critically examine the opposing demands that they confront. A 
more critical examination enables decision makers to grapple with conformity-deviation 
tensions (Denison, Hooijberg, & Quinn, 1995; Lewis, 2000)—and thereby 
simultaneously reduce both risks. 
 My hypothesis that clashing cognitions enhances people’s ability to flexibly cope 
with competing demands has parallels to other research streams. For example, people 
caught in “accountability cross-fire” more complexly shift between considering the 
demands of each party—and exert high cognitive efforts to find an integrative solution 
(Green et al., 2000). People who are exposed to foreign cultural environments that clash 
with their domestic understandings integratively shift between the foreign and 
indigenous cognitive schemas (Leung, Maddux, Galinsky, & Chiu, 2008). Finally, people 
who experience conflicting negative and positive emotions (Fong, 2006)—or other 
paradoxical cognitive frames (Miron-Spektor et al., 2011b)—flexibly consider competing 
elements to resolve the conflict. 
Hypothesis 3. Construal shifting mediates the interactive effects of cultural 
values and accountability. Congruent combinations of collectivist values / 
process accountability and individualist values / outcome accountability 
exacerbate the risks of conformity and deviation biases because they trigger 
weaker levels of construal shifting. Incongruent combinations of collectivist 
values / outcome accountability and individualist values / process 
accountability reduce the risks of conformity and deviation biases because they 
trigger stronger levels of construal shifting. 
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STUDY 2: METHODS 
 I tested all three hypotheses in a second study. Study 2 differs from Study 1 in two 
fundamental ways. First, in addition to replicating Hypothesis 1, Study 2 examines why 
incongruent combinations of cultural values and accountability systems enables decision 
makers to bring down both risks. Second, Study 2 builds on the strengths but also 
corrects for the weaknesses of Study 1. Study 1 presented participants with a series of 54 
trials and after each trial they received feedback on their performance. Given the 
presence of multiple trials and feedback, it is interesting that people in the congruent 
combinations of collectivist values / process accountability and individualist values / 
outcome accountability continued to conform or deviate, respectively, even in the face of 
negative feedback. But, at the same time, people in the incongruent conditions were also 
afforded the opportunity to learn what type of environment they were in over the series 
of trials. In real world decision environments, managers are not always afforded such 
luxuries—and often are forced to make single judgments. To correct for this limitation of 
Study 1, Study 2 measures binary decisions to conform or deviate at single points in time 
(with no feedback). Study 2 therefore offers a more conservative test of the proposed 
hypotheses. 
Sample, Design, and Procedures 
 Four hundred and one students at a private East Coast university participated in 
this study (64% female). They were recruited by the university’s behavioral lab in 
exchange for $10. Participants were randomly assigned to one of the eight conditions. 
Four respondents were deleted from the study due to “gibberish” open-ended responses 
for the construal shifting measure.  
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 Participants worked on decision making scenarios adapted from J.C. Penney’s 
“Fair and Square” case study (Ofek & Avery, 2013). In this case study, former CEO Ron 
Johnson fell prey to the risks of both conformity and deviation biases: (a) he deviated 
from internal crowds that heavily criticized an initiative that would replace the 
traditional practice of regular sales and discounts (“high-to-low” pricing) with an 
everyday low pricing (ELP) strategy, and (b) he conformed to internal crowds that 
supported the continuation of the ELP initiative despite negative initial results and 
continued to invest in ELP. These deviation and conformity decisions, respectively, led to 
Johnson being ousted from his position (Surowiecki, 2013). J.C. Penney has now 
reversed the controversial “fair and square” strategy (TIME, May 2013). 
 The decision making scenarios that participants worked on mirrored the 
decisions Johnson confronted. But the case was disguised as one that pertained to a local 
university bookstore. Participants were led to believe that they would be making a series 
of decisions for the bookstore and presenting these decisions to bookstore 
representatives during the lab session. To control for familiarity with the outcomes of the 
J.C. Penney case, all participants were asked to indicate on a 7-point scale the extent to 
which they were familiar with the case (“not very familiar” to “very familiar”). All 
analyses control for familiarity.  
Manipulations  
 Culture manipulations. I manipulated group culture by manipulating the 
values of the bookstore representatives to whom participants would be presenting their 
decisions. There were three steps to the culture manipulation.  
 In the first step, I told participants that last month, the university bookstore 
conducted a survey of their employees asking them to describe the organization’s culture. 
In the collectivist conditions, I told them that the top three most frequently appearing 
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items were maintaining harmonious relationships, assimilating with others, and 
pursuing organizational goals. In the individualist conditions, I told them the top three 
items were maintaining independence, being distinct from others, and pursuing personal 
goals. In the second step, I asked them to read fictitious HBR articles that were slightly 
adapted from Study 1 (see Figure 9). The article was presented as a recently published 
one that highlighted how the bookstore’s values were beneficial for organizations. In the 
third and final step, I asked them to describe three ways in which they could exhibit the 
same attributes/values as the bookstore employees and why they would think it is 
important to exhibit these values (Goncalo & Staw, 2006; Trafimow et al., 1991). 
 They completed a four-item manipulation check, with lower numbers reflecting 
collectivist values and higher numbers, individualist. On 8-point bipolar scales, they 
rated whether the bookstore representatives to whom they would be presenting their 
decisions were more likely to value: (1) Cohesion or Independence; (2) Fitting In or 
Standing Out; (3) Harmony or Dissent; (4) Collective Goals or Personal Goals (α = .99). 
 Accountability manipulations. The process and outcome accountability 
manipulations were similar to those in Study 1 and consistent with past research (e.g., 
Brtek & Motowidlo, 2002; de Langhe et al., 2011; Siegel-Jacobs & Yates, 1996; Simonson 
& Staw, 1992; Slaughter et al., 2006). Process-accountable participants were told that the 
researchers would evaluate them based on how they went about making their decisions 
(i.e., their thought processes, rationale, and reasoning) rather than on whether they 
ultimately made the “right” or “wrong” decision. Outcome-accountable participants were 
told that the researchers would evaluate them based on whether they ultimately made 
the right or wrong decision based on decision-making research rather than on their 
processes, rationale, and reasoning for making their decisions. All participants were told 
that $10 compensation for the study was contingent on the researchers’ evaluation of 
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their performance. To up the ante, I also offered eight cash prizes of $100 each for the 
highest performers. All participants signed a consent form granting the researchers 
permission to interview them at the end of their task.  
 I created a four-item manipulation check, with lower numbers reflecting process 
accountability and higher numbers, outcome accountability. The anchors for the 8-point 
rating scale were: (1) “I will be evaluated on the rationale behind my decisions (and not 
on the correctness of my decisions)” and “I will be evaluated on the correctness of my 
decisions (and not on the rationale behind my decisions)”; (2) “The researchers will ask 
me to explain my thought processes in making my decisions” and “The researchers will 
ask me to explain why my decisions are the right or wrong ones”; (3) “The researchers 
are more concerned with how I went about making my decisions and the rationale for my 
decisions” and “The researchers are more concerned with whether my decisions are 
ultimately right or wrong”; (4) “Even if my decisions are incorrect, I may still be 
evaluated favorably if I can successfully defend the rationale behind my decisions” and 
“Even if I can defend the rationale behind my decisions, I will still be evaluated 
unfavorably if my final decisions are ultimately incorrect” (α = 1.00).  
 Risk exposure manipulations. The stimulus materials differed depending on 
whether participants were in the conditions that exposed them to the risks of conformity 
or deviation biases. Reflective of the real-world decisions made by Johnson, the 
materials differed in the time period in which participants were making their decisions. 
(All stimulus information was kept as close to possible to that presented in the J.C. 
Penney “Fair and Square” case study by Ofek and Avery (2013)). 
 In the conditions that exposed decision makers to the risks of deviation biases, 
participants were told as an introduction: 
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“The Drexel Bookstore, which caters to members of the Drexel, UPenn, and larger 
Philadelphia communities, once enjoyed many years of steadily growing profits 
until 2008. Since then, it has experienced rapid declines and is in desperate need 
of a turnaround.” 
 They were then provided a fictitious graph of the bookstore’s declining net 
income from 2008 to 2013 (1st quarter). They were then told that the bookstore is 
currently facing three global pressures: 
1. Declining customer visits. In-store customer visits to the bookstore have 
declined. The UPenn Bookstores are taking away business from the high-end 
consumer base. Second-hand specialty and student-operated bookselling 
networks are taking away the low-end. 
2. Competition from online retailers. Competition is increasing from online 
retailing. The popularity of physical (“brick and mortar”) stores is declining. And 
the Drexel Bookstore is unable to provide an attractive in-store consumer 
experience. Whereas competitors are investing heavily in their e-commerce 
operations, Drexel Bookstore’s investment has remained stagnant.      
3. Lingering effects of 2008 economic recession. Bookstore consumers are still 
feeling the effects of the economic recession. Consumers are increasingly frugal. 
 Following this, they were informed that there was a proposal on the table that 
recommended that the bookstore entirely eliminate the traditional practice of regular 
sales and discounts by implementing the following everyday low price (ELP) strategy: 
1. Reduce all prices of books and merchandise by an average of 40% to offer 
consumers everyday low prices.  
2. Remove the words “sale” and “clearance” from any of its promotional 
messaging in-store and out-of-store. 
3. Replace the manufacturer’s suggested retail price on all book and merchandise 
tags (which traditionally also display the sales price) with the everyday low price. 
4. Break with the traditional retailing best-practice of ending all prices with .99, 
and instead round up all prices to the nearest dollar to end with .00. 
 Finally, they were told that the majority of managers in the bookstore (including 
the representatives to whom they would be presenting their decisions) did not support 
implementing the ELP strategy. Thus, participants who chose to deviate from the 
majority would be committing a deviation error. 
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 The conditions that exposed participants to the risks of conformity biases had 
similar stimulus materials but they started at a different time. As an introduction, these 
participants were told: 
“The Drexel Bookstore, which caters to members of the Drexel, UPenn, and larger 
Philadelphia communities, once enjoyed many years of steadily growing profits 
until 2007. Since then, it has experienced rapid declines and is in desperate need 
of a turnaround.”  
 They were then provided a fictitious graph of the bookstore’s declining net 
income from 2007 to 2012. They were then told that the bookstore faced the three global 
pressures that were described above. Following this, they were informed that the 
bookstore decided to eliminate the traditional practice of regular sales and discounts and 
implement the everyday low price (ELP) strategy. The four components of the ELP 
strategy described above were provided to them. A point of departure from the 
aforementioned conditions, these participants were told that the results of the ELP 
strategy since the launch in November 2012 to March 2013 have been lower than 
expected. Specifically, they were told that the bookstore incurred significant earnings 
loss during the first quarter of 2013 due to plummeting sales revenues (-19%), gross 
margin compression (from 40.5% to 37.6%), and decreasing customer conversion. 
 Finally, they were told that the majority of managers in the bookstore (including 
the representatives to whom they would be presenting their decisions) did support 
continuing the ELP strategy. Thus, participants who chose to conform to the majority 
would be committing a conformity error. 
Measures 
 Binary continue/implement decisions. In the conditions that exposed 
participants to the risks of conformity biases, participants had to decide whether to 
continue each of the four components of the ELP strategy. In the conditions that exposed 
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participants to the risks of deviation biases, participants had to decide whether to 
implement each of the four components. The choices were binary Yes vs. No. For each 
participant, I tallied up the number of “Yes’s” across the four components. 
 Monetary allocation decisions. Participants also had to allocate a $500,000 
bookstore budget towards continuing the ELP strategy vs. abandoning the ELP strategy 
in the exposure to conformity risks conditions—or implementing the ELP strategy vs. 
seeking out alternative proposals in the exposure to deviation risks conditions.
 Construal shifting. After they made their decisions, participants were asked to 
write down all their thoughts and reasoning while making their decisions. They were 
given the prompt, “What came to mind? What did you consider? What did you think 
about?”—and instructed to be as comprehensive and thorough as possible. Three coders 
who were blind to the conditions were trained to rate the randomly-sorted open-ended 
responses.  
 Construal shifting was rated on a 5-point scale provided in Table 2. A rating of 1 
captured an exclusive concrete or abstract focus; a rating of 3, a focus shift from 
concrete-to-abstract or abstract-to-concrete; and a rating of 5, a full iterative shift from 
concrete-to-abstract and abstract-to-concrete. Ratings of 2 and 4 represent transitional 
levels between these milestones. Specifically, a rating of 2 reflected a weak concrete-to-
abstract or abstract-to-concrete linkage, and a rating of 4 reflected a weak link in the full 
iteration between the concrete and abstract. Note that similar to related constructs on 
cognitive thought (e.g., see integrative complexity, Baker-Brown et al., 1992) coders were 
specifically trained to focus on the conceptual structure of the participants’ reasoning 
rather than on their subjective evaluation of the content of the participants’ response 
(i.e., the rightness or wrongness of the responses).  
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 Of course, what constitutes “concrete” and “abstract” depends on the particular 
decision context (Magee et al., 2010). For this decision context, the concrete micro 
details were defined as the four specific components of the ELP strategy and the abstract 
elements were defined as the global, environmental issues that the bookstore was facing 
(declining customer visits, competition from online retailers, lingering effects of 2008 
economic recession). This demarcation satisfies the subordination criterion for 
distinguishing the concrete and abstract that is discussed in CLT research. The 
subordination criterion suggests that the meaning of low-level, concrete aspects of a 
decision depends more on high-level, abstract representations than vice versa (Burgoon, 
Henderson, & Markman, 2013; Liberman et al., 2007b). In this study, the efficacy of the 
ELP strategy is contingent on the environmental issues confronting the bookstore—and 
is only one strategy out of many that can help to exacerbate or solve these issues. By 
contrast, broad environmental issues are stable characteristics of the competitive space 
in which the bookstore operates.     
Figure 10 contains a schematic map of the coding scheme that was provided to 
the coders during training sessions. Participants who focused only on the pros and cons 
of the ELP strategy (e.g., whether prices should end in .99 or .00)—or on the global 
issues of the bookstore (e.g., competition from online retailers)—received scores closer to 
1. Participants who thought about how the ELP strategy helped or prevented the 
bookstore from addressing the global issues—and provided concrete details on what the 
bookstore could do to address the global issues—received scores closer to 5. 
 Reliability (ICC2 = .90, p < .001) and agreement (AD = .35) among the three 
coders were high (LeBreton & Senter, 2008). As such, I averaged ratings into a single 
construal shifting scale. Table 3 contains examples of participant responses for each level 
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of the scale. Bold text in parentheses indicates key points in the conceptual structure of 
the responses.               
STUDY 2: RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 Table 4 shows means and standard deviations of the manipulation checks and 
dependent variable measures by experimental condition. A 2 x 2 x 2 MANOVA revealed a 
significant effect of the culture manipulation on the culture scale (F (1, 401) = 29611.14, p 
< .001) and a significant effect of the accountability manipulation on the accountability 
scale (F (1, 401) = 29267.63, p < .001). The collectivist conditions differed from the 
individualist conditions (M = 1.08 vs. M = 7.78), (t (198) = -170.56, p < .001). The 
process accountability conditions also differed from the outcome accountability 
conditions (M = 1.06 vs. M = 7.90), (t (199) = -174.33, p < .001). No other effects were 
significant. Thus, the manipulations had the desired effects. 
 To retest Hypothesis 1, the interactive effects of group culture and accountability 
on conformity and deviation biases, I ran a 2 x 2 Culture by Accountability ANCOVA1 on 
two scales: (a) the scale of binary decisions, calculated as the number of elements in the 
ELP strategy that the participant marked as “Yes” to continue or implement (higher 
numbers reflect greater support for continuing or implementing the ELP strategy), and 
(b) the scale of investment decisions to continue or implement the ELP strategy. Figures 
11 and 12 display plots of these analyses, respectively.     
                                                          
1
 All analyses controlled for familiarity. Familiarity had a significant effect on the binary decision and 
investment scales in the exposure to conformity risks conditions (b = -.10, s.e. = .04, β = -.19, t = -2.70, p < 
.01; b = -14275.15, s.e. = 6003.45, β = -.17, t = -2.38, p < .05). But familiarity had only a marginally 
significant effect on the binary decision scale and no significant effect on the investment scales in the 
exposure to deviation risks condition (b = -.09, s.e. = .05, β = -.13, t = -1.84, p < .10; b = -8838.12, s.e. = 
6799.46, β = -.09, t = -1.30, p > .10). A 2 x 2 Culture by Accountability ANOVA without familiarity as a 
control yields a significant interaction for the binary scale (F(1, 197) = 5.34, p < .05) and investment scale 
(F(1, 197) = 4.43, p < .05) in the risks of conformity bias conditions—and significant interaction for the 
binary scale (F(1, 196) = 13.21, p < .001) and investment scale (F(1, 196) = 10.70, p = .001) in the risks of 
deviation bias conditions. 
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 The ANCOVA on the binary decision scale revealed significant interaction effects 
for both risk-exposure conditions (exposure to conformity risk: F (1, 201) = 4.75, p < .05, 
η2 = .02; exposure to deviation risk: F (1, 200) = 12.10, p < .01, η2 = .06). When exposed 
to the risks of conformity biases, participants in the congruent combination of collectivist 
values / process accountability supported continuing more elements of the ELP strategy 
than those in the incongruent combination of collectivist values / outcome accountability 
(M = 2.10 vs. M = 1.44), (F(1, 197) = 10.06, p < .01). When exposed to the risks of 
deviation biases, participants in the congruent combination of individualist values / 
outcome accountability supported implementing more ELP elements than those in the 
incongruent combination of individualist values / process accountability (M = 2.64 vs. M 
= 1.80), (F(1, 196) = 12.36, p = .001).  
 Similar interactive patterns emerged in the ANCOVAs for the investment scale 
(exposure to conformity risk: F (1, 201) = 4.27, p < .05, η2 = .02; exposure to deviation 
risk: F (1, 200) = 9.97, p < .01, η2 = .05). When exposed to the risks of conformity biases, 
participants in the congruent combination of collectivist values / process accountability 
invested more in continuing the ELP strategy than those in the incongruent combination 
of collectivist values / outcome accountability (M = $311,500 vs. M = $185,400), 
(F(1,197)=16.4, p < .001). When exposed to the risks of deviation biases, participants in 
the congruent combination of individualist values / outcome accountability invested 
more in implementing the ELP strategy than those in the incongruent combination of 
individualist values / process accountability (M=$362,800 vs. M=$235,460), (F(1,196) = 
14.44, p < .001). 
 Hypothesis 1 was thus fully supported and replicated: accountability moderated 
the effects of cultural values such that decision makers in the incongruent combinations 
reduced the risks of both conformity and deviation biases.   
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 Hypotheses 2 and 3 proposed that the reasons why these culture by 
accountability patterns emerge was that incongruity enhances construal shifting 
(Hypothesis 2)—and construal shifting in turn enables people to reduce both risks 
(Hypothesis 3).  
 To test Hypothesis 2, I ran a 2 x 2 Culture by Accountability ANCOVA on 
construal shifting across both risk conditions. Figure 13 displays this plot. There was a 
significant interaction effect, (F (1, 396) = 16.02, p < .01, η2 = .04). Participants in the 
incongruent combination of individualist values / process accountability did engage in 
higher levels of construal shifting than did those in the congruent combination of 
individualist values / outcome accountability (M=2.10 vs. M=1.51), (F(1, 397) = 21.21, p 
< .001). But participants in the incongruent combination of collectivist values / outcome 
accountability did not engage in higher levels of construal shifting than did those in the 
congruent combination of collectivist values / process accountability (M=1.76 vs. 
M=1.61), (F(1, 397) = 1.33, p > .05). Hypothesis 2 was thus partially supported. 
 Finally, to test Hypothesis 3 (the full mediated-moderation model), I first 
regressed construal shifting against the two dependent variables. In the exposure to the 
risks of conformity biases conditions, construal shifting was a significant predictor of 
binary decisions (b = -.67, s.e. = .08, β = -.52, t = -8.76, p < .001) and investment 
decisions (b = -75129.28, s.e. = 13105.85, β = -.37, t = -5.73, p < .001). In the exposure to 
the risks of deviation biases conditions, construal shifting was also significantly related 
to the binary decision (b = -.46, s.e. = .09, β = -.36, t = -5.38, p < .001) and investment 
scale (b = -65412.78, s.e. = 12167.29, β = -.36, t = -5.38, p < .001). All coefficients were 
negative such that higher levels of construal shifting predicted a lower likelihood of 
continuing/ launching the ELP initiative. 
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 Second, I examined the direct interactive effects of culture and accountability on 
the dependent variables, controlling for construal shifting. In the exposure to conformity 
risks conditions, the effects dropped to nonsignificance for each of the dependent 
variables: binary decision scale (F (1, 195) = 1.69, p > .10, η2 = .00) and investment scale 
(F (1, 195) = 1.96, p > .10, η2 = .01). In the exposure to deviation risk conditions, the 
effects decreased but did not drop to nonsignificance for the binary decision scale (F (1, 
194) = 5.34, p = .02, η2 = .03) and the investment scale (F (1, 194) = 3.99, p = .05, η2 = 
.02). This suggests partial mediation.  
 Third, I calculated the indirect effect of the product of culture and accountability 
on susceptibilities to the risks of conformity and deviation biases through construal 
shifting. The effect was evaluated using a 95% confidence interval based on 5,000 
bootstrap samples (using the PROCESS method, Hayes, 2013). The effect is significant if 
the interval excludes zero (Edwards & Lambert, 2007). The effects were significant in the 
conformity risks conditions: (a) binary decision scale (effect: .31, [.03, .60]); (b) 
investment scale (effect: 32864.63, [1501.56, 64628.79]). The same was true for the 
deviation risks conditions: (c) binary decision scale (effect: .42, [.17, .71]); (d) investment 
scale (effect: 58071.25, [23498.34, 100276.34]). Hypothesis 3 was thus predominantly 
supported. Incongruent combinations of cultural values and accountability systems 
enabled decision makers to bring down the risks of both conformity and deviation biases 
because they encouraged higher levels of construal shifting. The advantages of 
incongruity were particularly apparent for the combination of individualist values / 
process accountability.  
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 As I argued, organizational behavior scholars to date have focused near-
exclusively on reducing the risks of conformity biases—but they have slighted the 
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opposing risks of deviation biases. This oversight has left us with a grossly limited 
understanding of how work contexts can be engineered to simultaneously reduce both 
risks. My studies take a step towards filling this gap. Using a methodology that enabled 
me to tightly control decision makers’ exposure to risks (while also constructing settings 
with high degrees of psychological realism), I demonstrated how and why different types 
of work contexts lead to different types of coping responses. I approached my research 
question from an integrative organizational culture-accountability lens—and in so doing, 
I offer a number theoretical contributions and open doors for a number of directions for 
future research.  
Theoretical Contributions 
 My studies make at least five distinct contributions. First, they qualify work on 
the disadvantages of structural incongruity. Scholars across a variety of research 
domains have championed the benefits of congruity—work contexts that send consistent 
signals to employees about what behaviors are or are not appropriate. For example, 
researchers have found that performance is enhanced when goal structures (e.g., group 
vs. individual) match task structures (e.g., reciprocal vs. pool) (Saavedra et al., 1993), 
goal structures (e.g., assigned, representative, or group) match socio-cultural structures 
(Erez, 1986), value structures match reward structures when evaluative pressures are 
high (Lee et al., 2004), and management cultural practices match national cultures 
(Newman & Nollen, 1996). Scholars have also championed the benefits of congruity 
within structures—e.g., conflicting goals (Locke et al., 1994) and hybrid incentives 
(Quigley et al., 2007; Wageman, 1995) tend to debilitate performance. Researchers 
studying the more macro, systems level of analysis have also argued that congruence 
among organizational structures enhances performance (e.g., Cameron & Freeman, 1991; 
Doty, Glick, & Huber, 1993; MacDuffie, 1995; Nadler & Tushman, 1980).  
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 These scholars have advanced a number of reasons explaining the benefits of 
congruity. For one, due to cognitive limitations, people tend to focus on what is 
encouraged or incentivized under one context at the expense of what is encouraged or 
incentivized under the other (Barnes et al., 2011). Additionally, people tend to hold 
consistent bundles of values, and incongruity inherently places them in value-conflicting 
situations, causing lower satisfaction (O'Reilly et al., 1991). Finally, people can deem 
incongruity to be procedurally unjust as it sends mixed signals about what is being 
rewarded; and, procedural injustice can ignite defiance (Tetlock, 1999; Tyler, 1990). 
 These studies challenge these findings by highlighting the benefits of incongruity 
in encouraging decision makers to shift into high-cognitive gear and cope with 
competing demands. However, note that given the evidence of the debilitating effects of 
incongruity, I do not attempt to make a broad-sweeping statement that incongruity is 
unconditionally beneficial. I concur that incongruity has the potential to send employees 
over the optimal stress point on the Yerkes-Dodson arousal performance curve (Yerkes & 
Dodson, 1908). Coping with incongruity is not pleasant. My position instead is more 
nuanced. When employees are at especially high risk of exhibiting conformity biases, it 
may be advantageous to offset the risks by enacting individualist norms and outcome 
systems. When employees are at especially high risk of exhibiting deviation biases, it 
may be advantageous to offset the risks by enacting collectivist norms and process 
systems. However, to the extent that organizational administrators cannot accurately 
assess the types of risks to which their employees are exposed, incongruent combinations 
of cultural norms and accountability systems may be able to shield employees. 
 Note that between the two incongruent conditions, I found that the combination 
of individualist values / process accountability generated higher levels of construal 
shifting. There are at least two reasons why the incongruent combination of collectivist 
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values / outcome accountability did not trigger higher levels of construal shifting. First, 
perhaps because I was working with a sample in the U.S., a more individualistic nation 
(Markus & Kitayama, 1991), my collectivist manipulation was not strong enough to 
produce the appropriate level of cognitive conflict. But, second, past research also gives 
some clues. Researchers have found that relative to outcome systems, process systems 
tend to prime more complex cognitions (e.g., Brtek & Motowidlo, 2002; De Dreu, 
Beersma, Stroebe, & Euwema, 2006; Scholten, van Knippenberg, Nijstad, & De Dreu, 
2007).  Process systems inherently signal to decision makers that the “answer” lies in 
how they think whereas outcome systems merely tell them to hit “home runs” (Siegel-
Jacobs & Yates, 1996). In support of these notions, I did find that between the two 
incongruent conditions, combinations of individualist values / process accountability 
trigger more complex cognitions than did combinations of collectivist values / outcome 
accountability. But I did also unveil an influential moderator of previous research that 
suggests a link between process systems and complexity of thought: process systems 
increase complexity of thought only when embedded in individualist values but not 
collectivist values. Future research is needed to tease apart these two incongruent 
conditions further, but this current research suggests that of the two incongruent 
conditions, combinations of individualist values and process accountability may be more 
beneficial in balancing opposing risks. 
 Second, these studies challenge the notion that the relationship between 
conformity and deviation risks is hydraulic: when people reduce the risks of conformity 
biases, they increase susceptibilities to the risks of deviation biases, and vice versa 
(Levinthal & March, 1993). In other words, some scholars have argued that managers 
can do no better than shift error-aversion priorities along a conformity-deviation 
tradeoff curve (Adler et al., 1999; Lavie et al., 2010). My studies directly challenge these 
77 
 
assertions by demonstrating the human capacity to simultaneously reduce both risks. As 
I will further elaborate below, these findings spawn new research questions about the 
boundary conditions under which incongruity does or does not reduce both risks. It also 
answers fervent calls from macro scholars who study how organizations strike a balance 
between exploitation (the use and development of current routines and capabilities) and 
exploration (the search for new routines and capabilities) (Lavie et al., 2010; March, 
1991). These scholars have called for organizational psychologists to examine how 
individuals manage analogous tradeoffs so they can build stronger links between the 
micro and macro levels (e.g., Gupta, Smith, & Shalley, 2006; Mom et al., 2009; Raisch, 
Birkinshaw, Probst, & Tushman, 2009). This article lays the foundations on which these 
micro-to-macro connections can be built. 
 Third, these studies help reconcile competing camps in both the organizational 
culture and accountability literatures. In the organizational culture literature, 
proponents of collectivist cultures (e.g., Chatman et al., 1998; Kaplan et al., 2009; 
Wagner, 1995) are pitted against proponents of individualist cultures (e.g., Bond & 
Smith, 1996; Kanter, 1988; Sutton, 2002b). Proponents of collectivist cultures point to 
the benefits of increasing collaboration and interpersonal helping (Moorman & Blakely, 
1995) whereas proponents of individualist cultures point to the benefits of increasing 
creative thinking (Goncalo & Staw, 2006). There have also been disagreements about the 
pros and cons of process versus outcome accountability (Patil et al., 2013; Tetlock et al., 
2013). Proponents of process accountability claim these systems reduce decision-making 
stress, thereby enhancing cognitive functioning (e.g., Brtek & Motowidlo, 2002; De Dreu 
et al., 2006; Schoemaker, 2011; Siegel-Jacobs & Yates, 1996). Proponents of outcome 
accountability claim these systems promote discovery and innovation (Coyne, 1997; 
Simons, 2005; Tetlock & Mellers, 2011b)—and that process systems frequently 
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degenerate into bureaucratic ritualism (Cardinal, 2001; Meyer & Scott, 1983; Pfeffer, 
1981a).  
 This article offers points of reconciliation for both camps in both literatures. I 
demonstrate that the downside risks of organizational cultures and accountability 
systems are accentuated when each are coupled with their congruent other—but 
attenuated when coupled with the incongruent other. Collectivist values and process 
systems send employees down conformist paths. Individualist norms and outcome 
systems send employees down deviant paths. But mismatched combinations better 
enable employees to cope with these competing demands. 
 Fourth, these studies advance the study of accountability in the field of 
organizational behavior. Thus far, accountability research has primarily remained in the 
domain of judgment and decision-making (Lerner & Tetlock, 1999). Since Tetlock’s 
(1985) seminal article on accountability, researchers have predominantly focused on how 
different types of accountability systems affect decision making (Fandt & Ferris, 1990; 
Gordon & Stuecher, 1992; Simonson & Nye, 1992). But little attention has been given to 
how accountability interacts with other organizational attributes to shape cognition. 
Using the terminology of Heath and Sitkin (2001), accountability researchers have 
predominantly adopted a “Contextualized-B” approach: they have identified a single 
social context to explain individual behaviors.  
 A downside of “Contextualized-B” approaches is that researchers do not tap into 
the unique phenomenon of organizing—or, the dynamism involved with aligning goals 
and coordinating action. These studies help correct this gap by taking a more “Big-O” 
approach to the study of accountability,. My studies propose that accountability systems 
constitute a norm-enforcement mechanism within a broader cultural value system—and 
I shed light on how two norm-enforcement systems dynamically interact to affect 
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behaviors important to organizational survival. This “Big-O” approach thus expands the 
applicability of accountability to organizational behavior research—and increases the 
validity of drawing conclusions about its effects in organizational life.  
 Fifth, these studies make fundamental contributions to CLT in two ways. For one, 
construal level theorists have called for studies on the contextual antecedents of 
concrete-abstract processing modes (Trope & Liberman, 2003, 2010). My examination 
of the roles of organizational culture and accountability heeds this call. But, perhaps even 
more importantly, construal level theorists have empirically examined the effects of 
adopting either a concrete or an abstract focus (Liberman et al., 2007b). They have not 
acknowledged the capacity of humans to engage in construal shifting—and blend the 
concrete and abstract. My conceptualization and empirical test of construal shifting 
demonstrates that the capacity of construal shifting indeed exists—and that construal 
shifting can tamp down the risks of exclusively focusing on either processing mode. It 
thereby encourages CLT scholars to move beyond merely delineating the pros and cons 
of exclusive concrete and abstract processing (the record of which is already quite 
extensive), and towards examining whether and to what extent people can shift between 
the two processing modes.  
Future Directions      
 I identify three avenues for future research. First, future researchers could pursue 
alternative perspectives to examining the conditions under which employees can better 
balance the risks of conformity and deviation biases. In this article, I adopted a cognitive 
perspective, examining how organizational cultures and accountability systems shape 
ways of thinking. But this is only one perspective. Alternatively, future researchers can 
adopt a motivational perspective. For example, optimal distinctiveness theorists posit 
that people have simultaneous, albeit competing, needs to fit in and stand out (Brewer, 
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1991; Hornsey & Jetten, 2004). When employees feel that they are too assimilated in 
their organizations, they may regain a sense of distinctiveness by excessively deviating. 
When employees feel that they are too distinct from others, they may regain a sense of 
similarity by excessively conforming. But when employees’ needs to fit in and stand out 
are balanced, employees may be less motivated to move towards either extreme.  A 
motivational perspective will greatly complement the cognitive perspective presented 
here by providing deeper insights about the conformity-deviation dialectic in 
organizations and enhancing the generalizability of the findings in this article. 
 A motivational perspective may also shed light on the additional mechanisms 
that are at play in my model. To recap, construal shifting only partially mediated the 
interactive effects of organizational culture and accountability when participants were 
exposed to the risks of deviation biases. The partial mediation suggests that other non-
cognitive variables could be influencing people’s decisions. One variable is perceptions of 
interdependence-independence from people’s group members (Singelis, 1994)—or even 
level of cooperation-competition with them (Grant & Dweck, 2003). In addition to 
shifting between the concrete and abstract, people may feel a sense of both 
interdependence and independence—and cooperation and competition—with their group 
members that enables them to bring down the risks of conformity and deviation biases. 
 Second, future researchers could examine the boundary conditions of the link 
between construal shifting and the reduction of both risks. My studies assumed that: (a) 
decision makers sufficiently understood how to blend the concrete and abstract elements 
of the decision such that they would arrive at the final decision to discontinue or not 
invest in the ELP strategy, and (b) decision makers were operating at a high level of task 
certainty. Future research should examine the extent to which people can develop and 
fine-tune their abilities to accurately shift between the concrete and abstract across 
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different types of decisions, across time, and across different levels of task predictability. 
And they should examine the extent to which these abilities strengthen or dampen the 
potential for employees to simultaneously bring down both risks.        
 Finally, given the studies that highlight the benefits of congruity vs. incongruity, 
it would be helpful to begin drawing contingency models on when one is better than the 
other. For example, dispositional variables may affect when one is better. Some may 
thrive while others may freeze under incongruity. People who are integratively complex, 
or more effective at linking different perspectives (Tetlock, Peterson, & Berry, 1993), may 
better tolerate and cope with incongruity that those who are less so. The same may also 
be true for those low in need for cognitive closure, or those who are motivated to 
thoroughly process information (Kruglanski & Webster, 1996). Examining these 
dispositional factors can help reconcile previous work on incongruity with my findings. 
Practical Implications 
 These studies inform practitioners of the ways in which cultural values and 
accountability systems can be engineered to appropriately manage the risks involved 
with conformity-deviation decisions. I found that combinations of individualist values 
and process systems resulted in the most complex cognitions. To reiterate, I advocate 
incongruity only to the extent that practitioners are unable to assess the risks to which 
their employees are exposed at any given point in time and cannot tolerate either set of 
risks. When managers assess that the environment especially punishes conformity biases 
and can absorb the risks of deviation biases, they can shift to congruent combinations of 
individualist values and outcome systems. When managers assess that the environment 
especially punishes deviation biases and can absorb the risks of conformity biases, they 
can shift to congruent combinations of collectivist values and process systems. But once 
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these assessments are unreliable and/or managers can no longer tolerate either risk, 
incongruity can serve as a protective shield.  
 Furthermore, my studies draw attention to a type of thought process—construal 
shifting—which has been largely unacknowledged in management research. Given the 
advantages of construal shifting demonstrated in this paper, practitioners may benefit 
from paying closer attention to how their employees shift between zooming into the 
small details and zooming out to see the big picture. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
BIASES IN EVALUATING CONFORMITY AND DEVIATION BIASES 
 
 In Chapters 1-3, I approached my core research question—how can work settings 
be engineered to enable decisions makers to bring down the risks of conformity and 
deviation biases—from the perspective of the employee. That is, I examined how 
incongruity provided employees with the flexibility to decide when to conform and when 
to deviate whereas congruity pushed employees to one of the response paths. This 
examination suggested that conformity and deviation biases would persist in 
organizations with congruent combinations of organizational cultures and accountability 
systems. However, another way that congruity could exacerbate these risks is by 
encouraging the managers of employees to tolerate (and even reward) those who exhibit 
these biases. The risks of conformity and deviation biases can be simultaneously reduced 
only if managers equally penalize both biases—or demonstrate no discernible preference 
for either. And different combinations of organizational culture and accountability 
systems can fundamentally shape these managerial preferences.  
 As I discussed in the previous chapters, managers in collectivist organizations 
value harmony, interdependence, and not standing out (Goncalo & Staw, 2006). As such, 
they are likely to actually be favorable to employees who exhibit conformity biases (as 
conformity facilitates harmony)—and be particularly unfavorable to those who exhibit 
deviation biases (which deters harmony) (Kim & Markus, 1999). These patterns are 
likely to emerge especially when collectivist values are coupled with process systems. 
Process systems inherently hold people accountable for their behaviors (Oliver & 
Anderson, 1994). Managers are likely to favorably react to employees who conform to 
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standard practices when they are operating in process systems—they should see 
conformity as behaviors intended to benefit the organization and deviation. But 
deviation should be seen as a harmful violation of behavioral standards.  
 By contrast, managers in individualist organizations value distinctiveness, 
independence, and standing out (Chatman & Barsade, 1995). As such, they are likely to 
tolerate employees who exhibit deviation biases (deviation signals willingness to be 
unique) than employees who exhibit conformity biases (conformity signals lack of 
uniqueness). And these effects are likely to be further exacerbated when individualist 
norms are coupled with outcome systems. Outcome systems inherently encourage 
employees to be innovative and go beyond standard practices to maximize outcomes 
(Patil et al., 2013; Tetlock & Mellers, 2011b; Tetlock et al., 2013). For this reason, some 
real-world executives such as that of 3M advocate outcome systems to unleash creativity 
(Coyne, 1997). Under these systems, managers should thus see deviation as beneficial 
(deviation indicates a willingness to be creative to increase outcomes) and conformity as 
harmful (it indicates an unwillingness to be creative) for the organization. 
 But we should witness no discernible preferences or tolerances for either bias in 
the incongruent combinations of organizational culture and accountability systems: 
collectivist culture / outcome accountability and individualist culture / process 
accountability. In conditions of incongruity, one system primes conformity values and 
the other, deviation values. As such, managers under incongruity should hold more value 
pluralistic rather than value monistic preferences (Tetlock, 1986; Tetlock, Peterson, & 
Lerner, 1996)—and see both conflicting values as equally important.  
 Based on these arguments, I hypothesize: 
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Hypothesis 1: Managers in congruent combinations of collectivist values / 
process accountability would rate employees more favorably when they exhibit 
conformity rather than deviation biases, and (b) managers in congruent 
combinations of individualist values / outcome accountability would rate 
employees more favorably when they exhibit deviation rather than conformity 
biases. 
STUDY 3: METHODS 
Sample, Design, and Procedures 
 To test these two hypotheses, I surveyed a range of working managers from a 
number of organizations using a scenario study. The study was a 2 (collectivist vs. 
individualist organization) x 2 (process vs. outcome accountability) x 2 (conformity vs. 
deviation bias) mixed factorial design. Organizational culture and accountability were 
between-subjects and employee bias was within-subjects. Participants were randomly 
assigned to one of the four conditions. 
 One hundred and fifty-seven managers (62% male) were recruited through 
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk, an online subject pool representative of the U.S. population 
(Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011). In order to participate in the study, they had to 
be employed in the U.S. and manage or supervise at least one subordinate or employee at 
their current place of employment. Participants on average managed 11 employees 
(range = 1-230). They took part in the online study in exchange for $2.00.   
Participants were asked to assume the role of a mid-level, supervising manager in 
the sales unit of Synergy Systems International (SSI). They were told that as a manager, 
they were directly responsible for overseeing a team of 10 salespeople—and that they 
manage the salespeople on a day-to-day basis, are responsible for their overall 
performance, and conduct their quarterly performance reviews. As part of the study, they 
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were to make a series of performance ratings for two of their employees, one who 
exhibited a conformity bias and other, a deviation bias. 
Manipulations  
 Organizational culture manipulations. I manipulated organizational 
culture by telling participants that last month, SSI conducted a survey of their employees 
about the organization’s culture and I listed the three most frequently appearing items.  
 In the collectivist conditions, they read:  
SSI organizational cultural values can best be described as collectivistic. 
Last month, SSI conducted a survey of their employees about the 
organization’s culture. Employees were asked to list what employees 
valued. The three most frequently appearing items were: 
 
 Maintaining harmonious relationships 
 Assimilating with others 
 Pursuing organizational goals 
 
These items suggest that people at SSI generally value interdependence, 
harmony, and finding common ground. A representative quote from one 
employee at SSI states: “Everyone cares about what ‘we’ can achieve 
together – not what ‘I’ can achieve alone. We operate as one.” 
 
 In the individualist conditions, they read: 
SSI organizational cultural values can best be described as individualistic. 
Last month, SSI conducted a survey of their employees about the 
organization’s culture. Employees were asked to list what employees 
valued. The three most frequently appearing items were: 
 
 Maintaining independence 
 Being distinct from others 
 Pursuing personal goals 
 
These items suggest that people at SSI generally value independence, 
dissent, and individual expression. A representative quote from one 
employee at SSI states: “Everyone cares about what ‘I’ can achieve alone – 
not what ‘we’ can achieve together. We operate as individuals.” 
 
87 
 
  As a manipulation check, I included four items that participants rated on a 7-
point Likert scale. The items started with “People at SSI generally value…” and followed 
with: (a) Cohesion-Independence; (b) Fitting In-Standing Out; (c) Harmony-Dissent; (d) 
Collective Goals-Personal Goals (α = .94). Lower numbers reflect collectivist norms and 
higher numbers, individualist norms. 
 Accountability manipulations. I manipulated accountability by providing 
participants with evaluation forms of SSI salespeople adapted from real-world evaluation 
forms described by Behrman and Perreault (1982) (see Figure 14). The evaluation forms 
for the process accountability conditions had items that captured sales behaviors (e.g., 
providing information; using technological knowledge; making sales presentations; 
controlling expenses). The evaluation forms for the outcome accountability condition 
had items that purely captured end sales outcomes (e.g., high market share, high level of 
dollar sales, exceeds sales targets).  
 They were told that supervisors have to complete these forms for each of their 
salespeople at the end of the sales quarter and that these ratings were on a 5-point scale 
from 1 “needs improvement” to 5 “outstanding.” The introductions to these forms varied 
depending on the condition. 
 The process accountability condition began with the text: 
SSI monitors the behaviors of their salespeople rather than the monetary 
value that they bring to SSI at the end of the evaluation period. 
 The outcome accountability condition began with the text: 
SSI monitors the final monetary value that they bring to SSI at the end of 
the evaluation period rather than the behaviors of their salespeople. 
I included three items as a manipulation check which they had to rate on a 7-
point Likert scale. The prompt was “SSI…” and the items were: (a) Holds salespeople 
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accountable for process-Holds salespeople accountable for bottomline results; (b) Values 
standard decision procedures and protocols-Devalues standard decision procedures and 
protocols; (c) Evaluates how salespeople go about doing their jobs-Evaluates the end 
outcomes of salespeople (α = .84). Lower numbers reflect process accountability and 
higher numbers, outcome accountability. 
Employee bias.  Participants were told that they were getting ready to complete 
evaluation forms for two employees. They were asked to read notes that they had 
collected for each of the employees; these were notes collected from co-workers as well 
as other managers who had observed the employees’ behaviors. There were two 
employees: Toby Ryans who exhibited conformity biases and Frank Wolfe who exhibited 
deviation biases. The order of the employees was counterbalanced.  
For Toby Ryans, they read the following notes: 
You are generally satisfied with Toby’s performance. But you have noticed 
that Toby almost always uses the same standard selling strategies that his 
colleagues have been using for years and that have become pretty widely 
accepted at SSI. Sometimes you think it would be more beneficial if he 
deviated from these practices. 
For example, Toby was recently interacting with a new client. Instead of 
“thinking outside the box” and thinking of creative ways in which SSI 
could cater to the unique needs of this new client, Toby just stuck to the 
same wining and dining venues, product pitching techniques, and client 
presentation rituals that SSI salespeople have been using for traditional 
clients. You think that Toby could have got much more business from the 
new client if he adapted some strategies to better serve the client. 
For Frank Wolfe, they read the following notes: 
You are generally satisfied with Frank’s performance. But you have 
noticed that Frank almost always deviates from the standard selling 
strategies that his colleagues have been using for years and that have 
become pretty widely accepted at SSI. Sometimes you think it would be 
more beneficial if he actually conformed to these practices. 
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For example, Frank was recently interacting with a new client. Instead of 
just following what people have already tested in the company and what 
has already proven to work, Frank chose totally different wining and 
dining venues, product pitching techniques, and client presentation 
rituals that SSI salespeople have never used before for its clients. You 
think that Frank could have got much more business from the new client 
if he just stuck to the standard strategies to better serve the client. 
Measures 
 Participants filled out the following measures for both employees. 
 Performance ratings. I had two sets of performance ratings. The first was a 
measure of overall performance adapted from Burris (2012). The measure consisted for 
three items: (a) How would you rate [employee’s] performance based on what you 
know?; (b) If a position were available, I’d recommend [employee] for a promotion; (c) If 
[employee] was promoted, I would expect him to perform in the new position (α = .80 
for conformity bias employee; α = .86 for deviation bias employee). The first item was 
rated on a 7-point scale (weak performance-strong performance) and the last two items 
were rated on a 7-point scale (strongly disagree-strongly agree).  
 The second measure was one of a composite of general managerial decisions. This 
measure consisted of 6 items that participants rated on a 7-point bipolar scale: (a) 
Decrease [employee’s] salary-increase [employee’s] salary; (b) Demote [employee]-
Promote [employee]; (c) Decrease [employee’s] responsibilities at SSI-Increase 
[employee’s] responsibilities at SSI; (d) Reassign [employee] to one of your less 
important projects-Assign [employee] to one of your more important projects; (e) Very 
likely to prevent [employee] from receiving a prestigious company award-Very likely to 
nominate [employee] for a prestigious company award; (f) Very likely to fire [employee]-
Very likely to retain [employee] (α = .81 for conformity bias employee; α = .89 for 
deviation bias employee).       
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 Promotion decision. Participants were then told that they were only allowed 
to promote one of the employees, Toby Ryans or Frank Wolfe. They were asked to select 
whether they would promote Toby, Frank, or neither of the employees. 
 Pro-organizational motivation. As another way to measure favorability, I 
also measured pro-organizational motivation using six items adapted from Burris 
(2012). Items were rated on a 7-point scale (strongly disagree-strongly agree). The 
items were: (a) The organization’s needs are important to [employee]; (b) [Employee] 
really looks out for what is important to this organization; (c) [Employee] will go out of 
his way to benefit the organization; (d) [Employee] is very concerned about improving 
the organization; (e) [Employee] is committed to the organization; (f) [Employee] is 
emotionally attached to the organization (α = .92 for conformity bias employee; α = .95 
for deviation bias employee). 
STUDY 3: RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 Table 5 contains means and standard deviations for all measures organized by 
experimental condition. To check if my manipulations had the desired effects, I ran a 2 x 
2 MANOVA. The organizational culture manipulation had a significant effect on the 
respective manipulation check (F (1, 153) = 161.49, p < .01). The collectivist conditions 
significantly differed from the individualist conditions (M = 2.43 vs. M = 5.22). The 
accountability manipulation had a significant effect on the respective manipulation 
check (F (1, 153) = 94.87, p < .01). The process accountability conditions significantly 
differed from the outcome accountability conditions (M = 2.75 vs. M = 5.04). No other 
effects were significant. 
 To recap, Hypothesis 1 stated that managers in the congruent conditions would 
rate the two employees differently such that managers in the collectivist culture / process 
accountability conditions would demonstrate a preference for the employee who exhibits 
91 
 
a conformity bias and managers in the individualist culture / outcome accountability 
conditions would prefer the employee who exhibits a deviation bias. However, those in 
the incongruent conditions would not rate these two employees differently.  
 To test Hypothesis 1, I compared the means of performance ratings for both 
employees for each combination of organizational culture and accountability system. 
Figure 15 displays the results for the overall performance ratings. As expected, managers 
in the collectivist organization / process accountability combinations rated the 
conforming employee higher than the deviating employee (M = 4.56 vs. M = 3.26), (t (41) 
= 5.13, p < .01). Managers in the individualist organization / outcome accountability 
combinations rated the deviating employee higher than the conforming employee (M = 
4.59 vs. M = 4.09), (t (35) = -2.01, p = .05). But managers in the incongruent 
combinations demonstrated no significant difference in ratings of the conforming and 
deviating employees [(M = 4.15 vs. M = 3.99), (t (38) = .63, p > .10) for collectivist 
organization / outcome accountability and (M = 4.18 vs. M = 3.99), (t (39) = .40, p > .10) 
for individualist organization / process accountability]. 
 Similar patterns emerged for the composite of general managerial decisions (see 
Figure 16). Managers in the collectivist organization / process accountability 
combinations made more favorable decisions for the conforming vs. deviating employee 
(M = 4.54 vs. M = 3.58, t(41) = 4.53, p < .01). Managers in the individualist organization 
/ outcome accountability combinations made more favorable decisions for the deviating 
vs. conforming employee (M = 4.47 vs. M = 4.07, t(35) = -2.14, p < .05). But, again, 
managers in the incongruent combinations were equally (un)favorable to both 
employees [(M = 4.27 vs. M = 4.17), (t (38) = .55, p > .10) for collectivist norms / 
outcome accountability and (M = 4.25 vs. M = 4.09), (t (39) = .86, p > .10) for 
individualist norms / process accountability]. 
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 Next, I looked at the counts for the managers’ promotion decisions. I ran 
nonparametric binomial tests to see if the percentage of managers who chose to promote 
the employee who exhibited conformity biases vs. the employee who exhibit the 
deviation biases significantly differed (test proportion = .50). Table 6 displays the 
results. As we can see here, there was a significant difference in preferences in the 
collectivist organization / process accountability conditions. These managers chose the 
conforming employee over the deviating employee (48.28% vs. 20.69%, p < .05). There 
was a marginally significant difference in preferences in the individualist norms / 
outcome accountability conditions. These managers chose the deviating employee over 
the conforming employee (29.33% vs. 56.00%, p = .10). A chi-square test revealed a 
significant difference in the proportion of participants who supported the deviating 
employee (chi-square = 7.87, d.f. = 1, p < .01). But there was no significant difference in 
preferences for the incongruent conditions [(34.57% vs. 44.44%, p > .10 in the 
collectivist norms / outcome accountability conditions) and (31.33% vs. 31.33%, p > .10 
in the individualist norms / process accountability conditions].  
 I ran a similar analysis for pro-organizational motives, comparing the means for 
each of the four combinations. Figure 17 graphs the results. I found that managers in the 
collectivist organization / process accountability conditions viewed the employee who 
exhibited conformity biases as more pro-organizational than the employee who exhibited 
deviation biases (M = 4.53 vs. M = 3.63, t(41) = 3.20, p < .01). The opposite was true for 
managers in the individualist organization / outcome accountability conditions. These 
managers thought the employees who exhibited deviation biases were more pro-
organizational (M = 4.45 vs. M = 3.94, t(35) = -2.00, p = .05). However, yet again, we see 
no significant differences in assessments in the incongruent conditions [(M = 4.27 vs. M 
= 4.02), (t (38) = .91, p > .10) for collectivist organization / outcome accountability and 
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(M = 4.15 vs. M = 3.82), (t (39) = 1.38, p > .10) for individualist organization / process 
accountability]. 
 These findings cumulatively suggest that Hypothesis 1 was largely supported. 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 This study demonstrated the potential for incongruity to prevent managers from 
exhibiting biases in evaluating conformity and deviation biases. Managers in incongruity 
favored neither bias. However, future research should tease apart whether those in the 
incongruent combinations are either penalizing both biases equally (i.e., they are 
intolerant of both) or rewarding both biases equally (i.e., they are simply indifferent to 
both). In Table 6, there was an unexpectedly high proportion of managers who chose 
between the two employees rather than choosing neither of the employees (32 / 39 
managers in the collectivist organization/ outcome accountability conditions and 26 / 40 
in the individualist organization / process accountability conditions). The data are thus 
currently insufficient to draw any definitive conclusions: managers under incongruity 
may show no preference between the biases but it is unclear whether they regard both 
these biases more positively or negatively.  
 Nevertheless, this study takes a step towards making at least three distinct 
theoretical contributions. First, most research on values and value preferences has taken 
a dispositional approach (e.g., Grant & Rothbard, 2014; Schwartz & Bilsky, 1987; 
Tetlock, 1986). This study looks at how value preferences can be shaped by work 
contexts. Second, past research suggests that because people in collectivist settings are 
more concerned with fostering relationships than are people in individualist settings 
(Hui et al., 1991), they tend to be more generous in evaluating others (assuming the 
targets of evaluation are in their in-group, Gómez et al., 2000). My study qualifies this 
notion by pointing out that managers in collectivist organizations are tolerant only to the 
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extent that employees exhibit values that are consistent with collectivism. Managers 
were not afraid to penalize employees who exhibited deviation biases. Finally, scholars 
have noted that some organizations do not necessarily want or value creativity (Staw, 
1995). This study identifies this type of organization whose managers are likely to not 
tolerate deviant endeavors: those with strong collectivist values and process-oriented 
systems. 
 In addition to deciphering whether managers in incongruent conditions are 
equally tolerant or intolerant of employees who exhibit conformity or deviation biases, 
future research can examine the mediating mechanisms that explain why the patterns I 
found in this study emerged. For example, managers under combinations of collectivist 
organizations/ process accountability may find conforming employees more competent 
or even likable whereas managers under combinations of individualist organizations/ 
outcome accountability may find deviating employees to be more so. Alternatively, 
managers could purely be making cost-benefit analyzes: managers under collectivist 
organizations/ process accountability incur socio-political costs when employees 
excessively deviate and managers under individualist organizations/ outcome 
accountability incur similar costs when employees excessively conform.  
 Future research should also supplement this scenario study with a field study 
that increases the external validity of my findings. A multi-unit organization that has 
variability in performance/ accountability metrics and subunit cultures would be ideal. 
Researchers can obtain objective or subjective measures of accountability and culture 
and promotion/ performance evaluation decisions can be tracked over time. We should 
see a disproportionate number of conformist employees or deviant employees being 
evaluated favorably in the congruent combinations.  
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CONCLUSION 
 One of the main objectives of my dissertation was to demonstrate the importance 
of shedding insights into the conformity-deviation balancing act that employees confront 
in organizations. During the dissertation process, I learned that scholarship is in and of 
itself a balancing act on a number of dimensions. For one, strong theoretical 
contributions stem from blending diverse theories but powerful contributions also tend 
to be precise and parsimonious. My initial drafts of my dissertation during the proposal 
phase attempted to integrate a multitude of theories; I explained a wide range of 
employee behaviors that loosely related to under- and over-adapting the status quo. 
Although the theoretical models were comprehensive, the lack of precision diluted my 
arguments and obscured the logic of my arguments. It was not until the later phases that 
I narrowed down my phenomenon of interest to the decisions that employees often have 
to make to conform to or deviate from the status quo. Starting with this phenomenon, I 
began generating the idea of incongruity to explain the conditions under which 
employees would make better conformity-deviation decisions. At this stage, I began 
receiving feedback that I was contributing to the field.  
 Empirical testing is also a balancing act. I had to design experiments that were 
rich in terms of creating a psychologically realistic setting but also elegant and simplistic 
enough to explain to an audience. My initial runs of the J.C. Penney experiment were 
filled with extraneous information and details that not only weakened the internal 
validity of the experiments but also made it difficult for the participants themselves to 
process the information. Conducting experiments that work requires enormous 
perspective-taking and the ability to think like the participant, but it is also necessary to 
get accurate and realistic measures of the variables of interest. I was attempting to 
measure construal shifting (a fairly demanding form of cognition), and I needed variance 
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in this measure. It took a while for me to adjust the experiments to bring the cognitive 
load for the participants to an appropriate level while also getting reliable measures of 
cognition. 
Taking a step back, I also realized that the entire research process requires 
shifting between the abstract and concrete—and balancing the need to be creative while 
also practical. Idea generation requires looking at the big picture, integrating multiple 
theories, and seeing where your arguments fit into the larger literature but execution of 
studies requires acute attention to detail, patience, and perseverance. And after the 
results are generated, it is also necessary to see how the results support—or fail to 
support—the theoretical arguments you are trying to make and identify ways in which 
the theory can be strengthened to explain the findings. Although the research process is 
cognitively demanding, it is highly rewarding to be able to find answers to questions that 
spark your curiosity.    
 There are at least three different directions I want to take my research. The first is 
to study some of the ideas presented here in the field. As I discussed in Chapter 2, I 
chose to test my hypotheses using a laboratory methodology so that I could decrease the 
hindsight bias. Of course, laboratory experiments increase the internal validity of my 
findings but they also come at the cost of external validity. As such, to bolster the 
external validity of my tests, I plan to study the effects of construal shifting on real-world 
decisions to conform to or deviate from the status quo. Of note, I am currently in the 
process of studying the decisions of Army Intelligence officers who have to participate in 
training simulations as part of their recertification requirements. These intelligence 
officers have to make decisions whether to conform to or deviate from standard 
protocols based on a host of factors including the level of threat, government 
relationships, the terrain, and weather conditions. I am particularly interested in digging 
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deeper into the construct of construal shifting by examining whether people blend or 
shift between the concrete and abstract, how frequently they shift between the two 
vantage points, and when they decide to move from one point to the other. The types of 
decisions these intelligence officers have to make—and the type of information they have 
to process—enable me to study construal shifting under a more microscopic lens. 
 Second, I would like to study construal shifting at the team level. In particular, I 
would like to examine how the composition of teams—i.e., whether they are primarily 
composed of abstract thinkers, concrete thinkers, or a blend of both—affects the team’s 
ability to balance opposing risks. I could study conformity-deviation decisions as the 
dependent variable, but I could also study other conflicting demands. For example, 
innovation is a two-step process requiring novel idea generation (thinking outside-the-
box) and implementation and execution of the idea (conforming to current bureaucratic 
realities) (Miron-Spektor, Erez, & Naveh, 2011a). Similar to Bunderson and Sutcliffe’s 
(2002) distinction between interpersonal and intrapersonal functional diversity, I can 
also examine whether teams better balance conflicting demands if they are composed of 
equal numbers of abstract and concrete processors or composed of people who are 
strong construal shifters. Finally, I can examine team members’ expertise as a moderator 
of the link between construal shifting and balancing conflicting demands. Competing 
arguments can be made with respect to the effects of expertise. One argument is that 
construal shifting provides little added benefit to balancing conflicting demands for 
people who are experts—overpracticed people tend to respond habitually or “mindlessly” 
to their tasks (Dane, 2010; Langer & Imber, 1979). The other argument, however, is that 
people who are novices will not be able to effectively blend the concrete and abstract to 
extract the benefits of construal shifting (Vallacher & Wegner, 1987). Given these 
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competing arguments, there is likely an inverted U-curve in which the benefits of 
construal shifting peak at moderate levels of expertise.  
 Third, I want to explore other ways to generate incongruity in the workplace. In 
this dissertation, I examined combinations of organizational cultures and distributive-
justice rules and organizational cultures and accountability systems. However, there are 
other ways in which incongruity can be created. For example, I am interested in 
examining how the extent to which leaders engage in protectionist or paternalistic 
behaviors interacts with the extent to which leaders grant autonomy to shape employees’ 
susceptibilities to conformity or deviation biases. Protectionist or paternalistic behaviors 
refer to the degree to which leaders shield employees from harm and nurture their well-
being (Gelfand et al., 2007; Ouchi, 1981; Pellegrini & Scandura, 2008). Autonomy refers 
to the degree to which leaders provide employees with the freedom and discretion to 
determine what, how, and when to perform their work activities (Hackman & Oldham, 
1976; Morgeson & Humphrey, 2006). 
 I predict that managers who feel protected but experience low autonomy are 
likely to exhibit strong conformity biases. Employees under paternalistic leaders tend to 
demonstrate loyalty to sacred practices in the organization in return for the protection 
they are receiving (Aycan et al., 2000; Pellegrini & Scandura, 2006). Having low 
discretion in determining how to conduct work activities further exacerbates these 
effects. On the opposing end, I hypothesize that employees who have high degrees of 
autonomy but experience low degrees of protection are likely to exhibit strong deviation 
biases. This combination can liberate employees but it also leaves them without a “safety 
net” in the event of failure, causing them to desperately search for practices that will 
enable them to perform well. However, I suspect that employees are better positioned to 
bring down both risks when they experience high degrees of autonomy and protection. 
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At this point, employees achieve optimal distinctiveness (Brewer & Roccas, 2001; 
Brewer, 1991): they feel assimilated with and distinct from their organizations and 
leaders. 
 I am also interested in examining how incongruous combinations of self-reliant 
and prosocial norms can optimize help-seeking and help-giving dynamics within an 
organization. Integrating theories on adult attachment (Bartholomew & Horowitz, 1991)  
and self-reliance and giving (Nadler & Chernyak-Hai, 2014), I hypothesize that 
employees in (a) combinations of high prosocial norms/ low self-reliance norms are 
likely to engage in excessive help-giving and have an excessive dependency on help-
taking; (b) combinations of low prosocial norms/ high self-reliance norms are likely to 
withdraw help-giving and engage in counterproductive rejection of help; (c) 
combinations of high prosocial norms/ high self-reliance norms are likely to strike an 
optimal dynamic between help-giving and help-taking such that they feel both secure 
and autonomous in their relationships. 
 In sum, I hope to launch a portfolio of research that examines (a) the different 
ways in which incongruity can be more or less beneficial to balancing competing 
demands, and (b) the underlying cognitive and motivational processes that enable 
managers and employees to bring down these opposing sets of risks. 
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TABLE 1: Means and Standard Deviations (Study 1) 
 
Condition Collectivism-
Individualism  
(α = .99) 
Process-Outcome 
Accountability                               
(α = .98) 
Achievement 
Score
(ra) 
Task 
Predictability  
(Re) 
Consistency  
(Rs) 
Correlation  
(G) 
Collectivist, process 
accountability, conformity risk 
(n = 28) 
1.19 
(.32) 
1.39 
(1.07) 
.60 
(.07) 
.93 
(.00) 
.96 
(.05) 
.68 
(.10) 
Collectivist, outcome 
accountability, conformity risk 
(n = 26) 
1.05 
(.15) 
6.88 
(1.71) 
.69 
(.08) 
.93 
(.00) 
.91 
(.04) 
.81 
(.08) 
Individualist, process 
accountability, conformity risk 
(n = 28) 
7.74 
(.40) 
1.18 
(.48) 
.67 
(.09) 
.93 
(.00) 
.94 
(.05) 
.77 
(.11) 
Individualist, outcome 
accountability, conformity risk 
(n = 22) 
7.60 
(.55) 
7.55 
(.74) 
.69 
(.09) 
.93 
(.00) 
.90 
(.05) 
.81 
(.07) 
Collectivist, process 
accountability, deviation risk 
 (n = 25) 
1.13 
(.33) 
1.28 
(.74) 
.24 
(.07) 
.54 
(.00) 
.91 
(.12) 
.47 
(.11) 
Collectivist, outcome 
accountability, deviation risk  
(n = 28) 
1.05 
(.15) 
7.11 
(1.7) 
.20 
(.06) 
.54 
(.00) 
.84 
(.09) 
.44 
(.11) 
Individualist, process 
accountability, deviation risk 
(n = 27) 
7.75 
(.47) 
1.07 
(.27) 
.23 
(.05) 
.54 
(.00) 
.91 
(.08) 
.46 
(.07) 
Individualist, outcome 
accountability, deviation risk 
(n = 25) 
7.84 
(.33) 
7.64 
(.70) 
.14 
(.06) 
.54 
(.00) 
.78 
(.12) 
.32 
(.11) 
Note. Standard deviations are in parentheses.  
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TABLE 2: Construal Shifting Coding Scheme (Study 2) 
 
Rating Conceptual Description Study-Relevant Description 
5 
(High) 
Participant considers how concrete aspects of the 
decision affect abstract aspects AND how abstract 
aspects should shape concrete details. Both concrete-to-
abstract and abstract-to-concrete links are strong. 
 
Participant considers whether the everyday low pricing strategy is meeting, or failing to 
meet, the global issues the bookstore faces, declining customer visits, competition from 
online retailers, and lingering effects of the 2008 economic recession AND considers 
what these abstract issues indicate that the bookstore could do besides the everyday 
low pricing strategy. Both these links are strong. 
  
4 
Participant considers how concrete aspects of the 
decision affect abstract aspects AND how abstract 
aspects should shape concrete details. Both concrete-to-
abstract and abstract-to-concrete links are strong. But 
either one or both the concrete-to-abstract or abstract-
to-concrete links are weak. 
 
Participant considers whether the everyday low pricing strategy is meeting, or failing to 
meet, the global issues the bookstore faces, declining customer visits, competition from 
online retailers, and lingering effects of the 2008 economic recession AND considers 
what these abstract issues indicate that the bookstore could do besides the everyday 
low pricing strategy. But either one or both the links are weak. 
 
3 
(Moderate) 
Participant considers how concrete aspects of the 
decision affect abstract aspects OR how abstract aspects 
should shape concrete details. The concrete-to-abstract 
or abstract-to-concrete link is strong. 
 
Participant considers whether the everyday low pricing strategy is meeting, or failing to 
meet, the global issues the bookstore faces, declining customer visits, competition from 
online retailers, and lingering effects of the 2008 economic recession OR considers 
what these abstract issues indicate that the bookstore could do besides the everyday 
low pricing strategy. The link that is chosen is strong. 
 
2 
Participant considers how concrete aspects of the 
decision affect abstract aspects OR how abstract aspects 
should shape concrete details. But the concrete-to-
abstract or abstract-to-concrete link is weak. 
 
Participant considers whether the everyday low pricing strategy is meeting, or failing to 
meet, the global issues the bookstore faces, declining customer visits, competition from 
online retailers, and lingering effects of the 2008 economic recession OR considers 
what these abstract issues indicate that the bookstore could do besides the everyday 
low pricing strategy. But the link that is chosen is weak. 
 
1 
(Low) 
Participant only considers the concrete aspects of the 
decision OR the abstract aspects. Participant response 
demonstrates little to no signs of shifting from the 
concrete to abstract or abstract to concrete. 
Participant only considers the pros and cons of the everyday low pricing strategy OR 
the global issues the bookstore faces, declining customer visits, competition from 
online retailers, and lingering effects of the 2008 economic recession. 
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TABLE 3: Examples of Construal Shifting Ratings (Study 2)  
 
Rating  
5 
(High) 
Everyday low pricing is not addressing the largest problems the bookstore faces. It seems the bookstore's main consumer base came from the 
success of previous pricing strategy and that was not what needed to be changed, since now that that has been changed the bookstore has declined 
in performance and lost its main consumer base. [concrete abstract] The bookstore needs to maintain its previous pricing strategy to keep its 
current consumer base, but to improve its performance and increase customer visits, compete with online retailers, and remain a competitive place 
for those that are frugal, [abstract issues] I believe the bookstore should put a lot of its money into improving the store's inside appearance, 
perhaps remodeling, redecorating, including a cafe where students will visit the bookstore to study and eat as well as purchase books and 
merchandise, and so forth [concrete ways to address abstract issues]. Additionally, the store should continue reducing prices to be low, to be 
competitive with online retailers and remain appealing to those frugal from the recession, but include the marketing strategies of sales, high low 
pricing and ending prices in .99, so as not to make consumers believe they are being cheated of cheaper items. While it may hurt the bookstore in 
the beginning to continue high-low pricing marketing strategies but have low prices, and to put a lot of money into inside appearance 
improvement, the changes will have long term positive effects that will make the changes worthwhile. (rating: 5.00) 
 
4 
This solution does not seem to directly address the problem.  Online retailers like Amazon have consistently lower prices than bookstores, and 
trying to compete with them will not ultimately work.  People would rather order low-price books online than go to a store to buy low-priced 
books.  It may help get the customers feeling more frugal in, but only if they already prefer the experience of shopping in a store. [concrete 
abstract]    So it comes back to: they need to increase the in-store experience. [abstract issue]  Reducing prices only works if you can get 
customers into the store; the words "sale" and "clearance" clearly get people into the store (as seen when other college bookstores attempted this 
strategy; students love sales).  The pricing seems gimmicky (dollar-store-like), though that's just because as consumers we are used to .99 rather 
than .00.  Not showing the suggested retail price may seem more honest, as the list is partly fictional, but consumers don't know that, and telling 
them they're getting low prices but not allowing them to compare seems like a not good idea (less "transparency").  [explains how ELP strategy 
addresses abstract issue but doesn’t propose anything new]  Ultimately, if the team of employees does not agree, this plan will not be 
implemented and integrated well into the bookstore community, which seems to be one of the major things the store has going for it. (rating: 
4.00) 
 
3 
(Moderate) 
If the bookstore was to lower their prices by 40 percent all around, they would still probably not beat some of the prices online [identifies 
abstract issue: online competition]. For example, you can save a lot of money on Amazon.com. Moreover, even if they do people use online 
buying because it is so much more convenient. Furthermore, the reason most people go in a lot of stores is because they see the clearance or sale 
sign outside the door and want to go in and buy something or browse. Normally, browsing leads to buying. I do not think eliminating sales would 
help bring customers into the stores. Maybe if they opened a coffee shop in the store, or offered special deals once a month to customers or to 
school students would be a better idea [identifies concrete ways to address abstract issue]. If they sold textbooks at 40 percent lower, however, 
that would be another story. Or if they had a company where you could buy and then sell back fairly easy.  (rating: 3.33) 
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2 
The current decline in the Drexel bookstore is not exceptional.  We have seen many book stores begin to fade as online sellers have become more 
popular and the advent of nooks and iPads where consumers can simply read their information digitally. [identifies abstract issue]   I believe that 
continuing with the everyday low price is a good option but that this does not mean necessarily removing the words "sale" and "clearance" 
because a 40% discount is most definitely a sale.  Seeing these words coupled with the higher manufacturing price listed on the books will make 
students/customers actually feel as if they are getting a deal and that is really what counts.  The article from the student newspaper, showed that 
students were "pissed off" because they felt like they were no longer getting deals when in actuality they may have been coming out better than 
before.  Returning the "sale" signs may reignite a bit of consumer confidence in the bookstore.  I am unsure regarding the switch from .99 to .00 
as ending prices.  I truly don't think it matters that much.  I've never been super excited by seeing .99 at the end of a price because I'm sure that 
once I pay taxes, that .99 will become irrelevant.  I don't think that ending prices are really that important in making consumers want to buy 
things. [identifies how concrete issues address abstract issue] (rating: 2.33) 
 
1 
(Low) 
I think that the messaging should remain the same, because it does tell people that there is a change "Everyday Low pricing" is a smart move. 
However, people need to actually see such a sale change on a daily basis and that would need to include a level of showing price comparison of 
some caliber. If that means, visibly showing them the price change that is being made to product with the 40% reduction, go for it. It is a whole 
lot smarter than just simply putting a price down. Also, the rounding to the 0 does show a very visible choice in not trying to rip people off which 
is also helpful. [purely concrete] (rating: 1.00) 
 
It is evident that the current and traditional strategies are not working. The data shows decline and without change, it is unlikely that Drexel will 
be able to make a turn around. While the new proposal is bold, it is refreshing and completely changes the "playing field". It distinguishes itself 
from other bookstores through these "subtle" tactics and may help increase customer visits even if other factors such as decor or amenities are not 
as competitive as nearby bookstores. [purely abstract] (rating: 1.00) 
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TABLE 4: Means and Standard Deviations (Study 2) 
 
Condition Collectivism-
Individualism  
(α = .99) 
Process-Outcome 
Accountability                               
(α = 1.00) 
Decision to 
Continue/ Launch 
ELP Strategy 
(out of 4 binary 
decisions) 
Investment to 
Continue/Launch 
ELP Strategy 
(out of $500,000) 
Construal Shifting  
(ICC = .90) 
Collectivist, process accountability, 
conformity risk  
(n = 50) 
1.08 
(.24) 
1.02 
(.14) 
2.10 
(.95) 
$311,500.00 
(141,050.18) 
1.44 
(.46) 
Collectivist, outcome 
accountability, conformity risk  
(n = 50) 
1.04 
(.18) 
7.85 
(.64) 
1.44 
(1.09) 
$185,400.00 
(172,853.72) 
1.67 
(.91) 
Individualist, process 
accountability, conformity risk  
(n = 50) 
7.78 
(.46) 
1.02 
(.14) 
1.42 
(1.05) 
$178,400.00 
(158,939.21) 
1.80 
(1.00) 
Individualist, outcome 
accountability, conformity risk 
(n = 51) 
7.91 
(.23) 
7.98 
(.14) 
1.41 
(1.06) 
$144,705.88 
(148,220.82) 
1.56 
(.81) 
Collectivist, process accountability, 
deviation risk  
(n = 49) 
1.17 
(.38) 
1.09 
(.30) 
1.61 
(1.26) 
$198,367.35 
(173,016.70) 
1.79 
(.87) 
Collectivist, outcome 
accountability, deviation risk  
(n = 50) 
1.05 
(.22) 
7.90 
(.47) 
1.22 
(1.30) 
$169,900.00 
(179,695.01) 
1.85 
(1.12) 
Individualist, process 
accountability, deviation risk  
(n = 51) 
7.62 
(.67) 
1.13 
(.39) 
1.80 
(1.11) 
$235,460.78 
(169,751.78) 
2.38 
(1.13) 
Individualist, outcome 
accountability, deviation risk 
(n = 50) 
7.82 
(.47) 
7.88 
(.59) 
2.64 
(1.10) 
$362,800.00 
(149,670.25) 
1.46 
(.56) 
Notes. Standard deviations are in parentheses. “ELP” stands for everyday low pricing. 
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TABLE 5: Means and Standard Deviations (Study 3) 
 
Condition Collectivism-
Individualism  
(α = .94) 
Process-
Outcome 
Accountabilit
y                               
(α = .84) 
Overall 
Performance 
~ Conformity 
Bias ~ 
(α = .80) 
General 
Managerial 
Decisions  
~ Conformity 
Bias ~ 
(α = .81) 
 
Prosocial 
Motivation  
~ Conformity 
Bias ~ 
(α = .92) 
Overall 
Performance 
~ Deviation 
Bias ~ 
(α = .86) 
General 
Managerial 
Decisions  
~ Deviation 
Bias ~ 
(α = .89) 
 
Prosocial 
Motivation  
~ Deviation 
Bias ~ 
(α = .95) 
Collectivist  
organization, 
process 
accountability  
(n = 42) 
 
2.22 
(1.44) 
2.46 
(1.43) 
4.56 
(1.02) 
4.54 
(.85) 
4.53 
(1.16) 
3.26 
(1.16) 
3.58 
(.93) 
3.64 
(1.26) 
Collectivist 
organization, 
outcome 
accountability  
(n = 39) 
 
2.66 
(1.17) 
4.97 
(1.31) 
4.15 
(.89) 
4.27 
(.58) 
4.26 
(.82) 
3.99 
(1.25) 
4.17 
(1.03) 
4.02 
(1.27) 
Individualist 
organization,  
process 
accountability  
(n = 40) 
 
5.08 
(1.27) 
3.06 
(1.42) 
4.18 
(.86) 
4.25 
(.63) 
4.15 
(1.03) 
4.08 
(1.09) 
4.10 
(.93) 
3.82 
(1.26) 
Individualist 
organization, 
outcome 
accountability 
(n = 36) 
 
5.39 
(1.59) 
5.04 
(1.61) 
4.09 
(1.08) 
4.07 
(.76) 
3.94 
(1.15) 
4.59 
(.95) 
4.47 
(.80) 
4.45 
(1.08) 
Note. Standard deviations are in parentheses. 
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TABLE 6: Promotion Decisions (Study 3) 
 
 
 
 
 
Collectivist 
Organization / 
Process Accountability 
Collectivist 
Organization / 
Outcome Accountability 
Individualist 
Organization / 
Process Accountability 
Individualist 
Organization / 
Outcome Accountability 
Employee 
who exhibits 
conformity 
bias 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
21 (48.28%) 
 
 
 
14 (34.57%) 
 
 
 
13 (31.33%) 
 
 
 
11 (29.33%) 
Employee 
who exhibits 
deviation 
bias 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
9 (20.69%) 
 
 
 
18 (44.44%) 
 
 
 
13 (31.33%) 
 
 
 
21 (56.00%) 
Neither 
employee 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
12 (27.59%) 
 
 
 
7 (17.28%) 
 
 
 
14 (33.73%) 
 
 
 
4 (10.67%) 
  
p < .05 p = .10 p > .10 p > .10 
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FIGURE 1: Distributive Justice and Organizational Cultural Systems and Risks of Conformity and Deviation Biases 
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FIGURE 2: Organizational Cultural Systems and Vulnerabilities to Conformity and Deviation Biases 
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FIGURE 3: Group Cultural Values Manipulations (Study 1) 
 
 
  
Collectivist Values Individualist Values 
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FIGURE 4: Estimated Marginal Means of Achievement Scores (ra) (Study 1) 
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FIGURE 5: Participant vs. Ideal Predictions (Exposure to Risk of Conformity Bias) (Study 1) 
A 
B 
C 
D 
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FIGURE 6: Participant vs. Ideal Predictions (Exposure to Risk of Deviation Bias) (Study 1) 
E 
F 
G 
H 
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FIGURE 7: Participant Weighting Strategies (Relative Regression Coefficients) (Study 1) 
  
Collectivist Group / 
Process Accountability 
Ideal Weights Collectivist Group / 
Outcome Accountability 
Individualist Group / 
Process Accountability 
Individualist Group / 
Outcome Accountability 
Collectivist Group / 
Process Accountability 
Ideal Weights Collectivist Group / 
Outcome Accountability 
Individualist Group / 
Process Accountability 
Individualist Group / 
Outcome Accountability 
Academic Performance (AP), Extracurricular Involvement (EI), Communication Skills 
(CS) 
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FIGURE 8: Absolute Difference from Ideal Predictions over Trials (i.e., Learning over Time) (Study 1) 
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FIGURE 9: Cultural Values Manipulations (Study 2) 
 
Collectivist Values Individualist Values 
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FIGURE 10: Schematic Map of Construal Shifting Coding Scheme (Study 2) 
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FIGURE 11: Estimated Marginal Means, Decisions to Continue / Launch Components of ELP Strategy (Study 2) 
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FIGURE 12: Monetary Investments to Continue or Launch ELP Strategy (Study 2) 
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FIGURE 13: Estimated Marginal Means, Cultural Values by Accountability on Construal Shifting (Study 2) 
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FIGURE 14: Salespeople Evaluation Forms for Accountability Manipulations (Study 3) 
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FIGURE 15: Overall Performance Ratings (Study 3) 
  
122 
 
FIGURE 16: General Managerial Decisions (Study 3) 
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FIGURE 17: Pro-organizational Motives (Study 3) 
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